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INTRODUCTION 
Iran, embracing 49,764,874 population is one of the 
230pulous and potentially richest country in V.'est Asia. It 
has had a brilliant history of development, culture and art 
and seen many ups and downs in the history where monarchy 
survived for more than 2,500 years till 1979. Then it gave 
way to the restoration of Islamic Republic. It has a wide 
area and open outlet to the water of Persian Gulf. The country 
is rich in terms of mineral resources, specially hydrocarbon 
and copper. 
Agriculture has been a primary occupation of Iranians from 
the very beginning of recorded history. It has played a very 
iraportant role in the economic development of the country. 
As late as 1960s Iran was self-sufficient in food stuffs„ 
Later on, the failure of government's policy, viz., land 
tenure system and overall agricultural policy was responsible 
for deteriorating performance of agricultural sector. The 
government assigned low priority to agricultural sector 
because the aim of former Shah of Iran was to make Iran an 
industrialised country at par with those of the industrialised 
nations of the west by the turn of the century. But the policy 
was ill-conceived because Iran has largely a consvimption 
oriented society. It was not possible for them to have 
1 Jumhuri-e-Islamie (Persian), Daily, Tehran, March 4,1987, 
p.11. 
industrialisation without simultaneous development of the 
agricultural sector. Industrialisation necessririly brings 
v.'ith it urbanisation and rapid expansion of industrio.! 
labour force. Therefore, agriculture has to provide additional 
food to the urban population with their increased income. 
Agriculture has to provide raw material and generate export 
in order to earn foreign exchange. Agriculture also provides 
labour as well as capital to industrial sector. Therefore, 
both the sectors have to be developed simultaneously in a 
country like Iran. 
Iran's system of farming has been based from ancient 
times on absentee landlords and landless peasants. The deposed 
King or the former Shah of Iran introduced land reform 
prograrame in 1962 in order to have fair distribvition of land, 
production as well as productivity among the fanners, but 
these programmes turned out to be a failure. There v;as no 
great impact on production and productivity in agricultural 
sector. After the distribution of land among the landless 
peasants, the government provided financial a3Sistancc2 to the 
farmers. But the policy of financial assistance was discri-
minatory and only big landlords or the farmer-owners with 
large land holdings could benefit from it. 
As regards the price policy, the government extended the 
policy of support prices for agricultural produce. But this 
support price was of no much consequence. International food 
prices during that time increased quite rapidly. The Iranian 
food prices rose at a rate higher than international prices. 
Iran imported huge quantities of food from other countries, 
and Iranian farmers suffered greatly. 
Though production in agricultural sectox" increased, 
there was either no change or very negligible change in 
productivity, some believe that the productivity in Iran vjas 
even zero. 
In different Plan periods the growth rates achieved by 
the agricultural sector were even lower than growth rates 
achieved by other sectors of the economy. 
When we critically examine former Shah's land reforn 
programme, it appears that late Shah introduced land reform 
programme of 1962 in order to get sympathies of the farmers 
by way of distribution of land among the landless peasants 
and eradication of absentee landlordism. At one stage, the 
distribution of land among landless farmers was done and later 
on in order to introduce modem farming, consolidation of land 
was done. Small pieces of land were taken from the fanners 
the farmers and consolidated. Subsequently foreign agro-
business firms were invited. But all of these things proved 
to be failure. The net result was that the country became 
net importer of food items. The migration of population from 
rural to urban areas took place and productivity declined 
sharply. Former Shah had, in fact, aimed to modernize Iran 
through rapid industrialisation. Agriculture sector could not 
get due attention of the planners. This sector was grossly-
neglected, 
Nov,', in the post-Islamic revolution period, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran having realised the importance of agriculture 
in the country^, has been paying special attention towards 
agriculture. The government has introduced land distribution 
programme and paid attention tov/ards the solution of water 
problem of agricultural sector. Therefore, agricultural 
sector during the last seven years has achieved high average 
grov/th rate of 7 per cent per annum. However, government 
cculd not get rid of its dependence on food imports. Though 
production increased as a result of bringing more land under 
cultivation, yet productivity was very low as compared to 
international standard. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran introduced support price 
in order to protect famjers from the middle-men and gave 
subsidies, seeds, fertilizers, farm machinery, etc., through 
cooperatives. 
The rise in prices of oil has increased the demand for 
agricultural products and has also increased country's 
capacity for rapid transformation of agriculture. But the 
country still imports food and other products. On an average 
Iran has to spend about US $ 2 billion a year on import of 
food items. Though enough funds are available for investment 
in agriculture and enough has been invested during previous 
plans, the country has not yet achieved targets of agricultural 
production. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the strategies 
adopted in past and assess the success and failures. The 
studies made so far have emphasised on land reforms and have 
hardly touched other aspects of agricultural economy. Eventually 
an attempt has been made to put forvard suggestions for change 
in strategy. 
Research Methodology 
The present proposed research work is an analytical and 
descriptive study. Relevant material, data, statistics and 
information have been collected from various primary as v;ell 
as secondary sources. I have consulted the publications of 
United Nations, F.A.0. and various other national and 
international organisations. In order to have a cross check 
and eliminate the element of exaggeration, a comparison of 
the material published by the Government of Iran and outside 
Iran has been made. I have made use of original sources in 
Persian language. 
AS far as raw data are concerned, the government sources, 
like the Ministry of Agriculture, Economy, Commerce, Infor-
mation, Plan Organisation, Bank Markazi Iran (Central Bank 
of Iran), other related financial institutions. Geological 
Survey of Iran, different international organisationn, and 
their- publications have been tapped. 
Framework 
Keeping in view the scope and objective of the study, 
the v/ork has been divided into five chapters. 
Chapter first deals with economic background of Iran and 
examines in detail the agrarian condition during 1920s, 30s, 
40s and 50s, and the steps which were taken to improve agri-
culture prior to 1960. 
Chapter second discusses in detail system of land tenure 
in Iran in respect of share-cropping system and security of 
tenure. 
The objectives and implementation of land refomn law of 
1962 under three phases has been analysed in chapter third. 
It also discusses the steps taken along with land reforin 
programme. 
The effect of land reform programme about ov;nership of 
land and size of holding, agricultural production and produc-
tivity, income distribution of rural and urban x^ox^ulation, 
are discussed in chapter four. 
The last chapter is based on conclusions drawn in the 
preceding chapters of present study and gives surrmary and 
conclusion. 
Chapter I 
IRAN'S AGRICULTURE Al^'D EARLIER ATTEMPT TO 
LAND REFORMS 
Iran, prior to 1935 known as Persia, lies in the southern 
part of northern Temperature Zone between 35 and 40 degrees of 
latitude North, and because of its geographic position on the 
earth's sur^face and the special nature of its topography, it 
is classified as an arid and/or semi-arid zone. The mean 
annual precipitation in Iran is only about 25-30 centimetres --
the equivalent of only one-third of the world's mean of 86 
centimetres. Iran is traditionally an agrarian economy where 
oil presently dominates the money-based economy. It is 
jsotentially one of the richest countries of the Middle East. 
In Iran, out of a total area of 165 million hectares, 19 
million or 11.5 per cent of the land is under cultivation, out 
of which about 5.3 million hectares is irrigated with traditional 
water supply system known as qanat and modem system of v;ater 
storage and sxipply. The rest of land which is mainly in wester^n 
provinces of the country is used for rain-dependent agriculture. 
Tv/o bleak stony deserts, the Dasht-e-Lut and Dasht-e-Kavir, eat 
into Central and Southeastern Iran, covering one-sixth of the 
entire country. These deserts have the reputation for being 
the least life-supporting in the world. 
A highly evolved system of under-ground channels, knov;n 
as qanats has been the traditional means of exploiting ground 
v^ ater. These channels, constructed in soft alluvial soil and 
upto 50 km long, bring water from foothills to cultivated areas 
relying solely on the gradient. The great advantage of the 
qanat system was that the channels could be built up at times 
of surplus rural labour,Roughly one-third of all irrigation 
as late as early 1970s relied on qanats. However, with the 
rural exodus and the increase in labour costs, ganats have 
suffered seriously because they are labour-intensive and require 
constant maintenance. As a result, a quarter of the qanat 
system has become inoperative through lack of adequate repairing, 
Agricultural activities in Iran may be divided into two 
main sectors — arable farming and animal husbandry. These 
tvv-o sectors together produce a variety of food, cash crops and 
industrial raw material. Arable fanning is dominated by the 
production of wheat (which covers about 60 per cent of total 
cultivated land) and barely (v;hich covers another 15 per cent 
of the area) . In the remaining 25 per cent of arable land,a 
large variety of crops, including rice, cotton, sugar-beat, oil 
seeds, pulses, fruits, vegetables and tobacco are cultivated. 
Cotton and rice (which are two most important cash crops in 
Iran) top this list with percentage share (respectively) of 3.5 
and 3.3 per cent in total land. Livestock farming consists 
mainly of sheep, goats and poultry production. The supply of 
mutton has been dominantly contributed by this sector, although 
1 Iran Almanac, 1977, p.416. 
v7ool, leather^ dairy products and poultry are also among 
the outputs, 
Iranian agriculture has always been partly settled and 
partly nomadic. At the beginning of the nineteenth century* 
the settled and nomadic rural populations were roughly equal* 
but by the end of that century there had been both absolute 
and a relative increase in settled agricultural population. 
They were about 5.0 and 2,5 million respectively in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. In consequence of the 
centx-alist policies of Pahlavi rule (1925-1979) there was a 
further absolute decline in the nomadic population. Reliable 
statistics are not available. However, by 1963 there were 
probably no more than 1,5 million nomads in the country. 
The state policy of enforced settled led to armed resistance, 
symbolised by the revolt (in the mid-1960s) by the Qashqai 
nomads in the southern province of Pars, But once the 
Qashqai revolt had been ruthlessly crushed, there could be no 
effective resistance against the settlement policy,However, 
the organisation of some settled agriculture is also tribal, 
and tribal agricultural activities can be both nomadic and 
non-nomadic. According to a 1976 estimate, the total tribal 
agricultural population was about 5 million, or 28 per cent 
of the entire agricultural population. 
10 
?^grarian condition in Iran during 20s & 30s; 
The First v;orld War had a devastating effect on Iran. The 
country \\'as used as a battlefield by the Turks, Germans, British, 
and Russians and many Iranian v;ere killed and invading armies 
ruined agricultural areas. peasants were taken from fields 
and forced to v.'-irk on military roads and other war projects. 
Irrigation v;orks, '.vhich required careful upkeep, were destroyed 
in many areas. The size of livestock and total cultivated area 
decreased. It also caused a fall in urban enterprises and 
population. The central government became weaker in the v,'ar 
period and thus local land-owners and tribal Khans rebuilt 
local axTned forces and reasserted power of fexidal control. 
Russian forces from Iran were called back during Russian 
Revolution. The British, who were trying to create a virtual 
protectorate, were stopped by Iranian nationalists and American 
liostility. The nationalists, reformers and radicals started 
to launch their movements due to war and post-war crisis in the 
country. These movemei.ts had varied goals from each other 
and also lacked nationwide characteristics. 
A coup in 1921 put down radical movement which had taken 
pov.'er in the north. The strong man of the Nev; Government 
had himself declared monarch, under the name of Reaa Shah in 
1925. The new regime was supported by those, who v/anted to build 
a strong and efficient nation without undermining the economic 
iziosition of the landlords or the middle class. As it was 
11 
pointed out by one scholar that the rule of Reza Shah meant a 
change in power from a tribal-feudal group to middle-class 
intellectual (new) laixJlord coalition. The regime initiated 
a policy of disfavour to tribal leaders, peasants, urban 
lower classes, and the clergy, but favoured the intellectuals, 
the urban and semi-urban middle class and landowners. The 
necessity for some economic and social reform merely to 
retain national independence and unity was clear to Reza Shah 
and his followers. Economic life was stagnant, social 
structure was essentially the same as before war, and in 
relation to the West, Iran was more backward than ever. 
The suppression of the post-war population movements and 
the institution of a centralized government with strong 
police power had put down lower-class discount, discouraged 
agrarian reform in 1920s, Agriculture recovered very slowly 
from the v/artime and there was decrease in production also, 
which was not overcome until 1925. 
In the 1920s, however, the growth of westernised groups and 
of demands for fundamental change encouraged Reza Shah to launch 
an impressive programme of reforms and nrademization outside the 
agricultural sphere. Modernized law codes, improvements in 
trans]3ortation and communication, the end of tariff limits 
and treaty privileges for foreigners laid the basis for indus-
trial development in Iran, In the agricultural sphere, on the 
other hand, Reza Shah relied on the support of old and new 
1 Nikki, R. Keddie; Iran: Religion, Politics and Society, 
Frank Cass and Company Ltd., London, 1980, p.166. 
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landlords and made himself the largest landlord In Iran. Many 
of his measures stx-engthened the position of the landlords. For 
example, the government passed a law, declaring that 'any 
village which had been in the continuous possession of one man 
for thirty years' becomes his private property. This, in fact, 
legalised expropriations acconplished since the mid-nineteenth 
century. In some areas there was still a feudal division of 
ownership. This law, together with other laws of 1928 and 1929, 
required registration of property, supported claims to land by 
the rich and powerful over those peasants and trlbemen previously 
considered as having some rights of possession on the land they 
worked. The wealthy were able to register land to which 
peasants had old titles. The upper classes had influence in the 
courts and were bureaucrates. They could prevail easily their 
vievfpoint. The land registration laws were a step to moder-
nization accomplished at the expense of peasants. 
The Civil Code of 1928, still xanaltered despite of its 
incompatibility with recent land reforms, also strengthened the 
position of landlores. Like the Registration Laws, the Civil 
Code recognised possession as proof of ownership rights, and 
helped in confirming acts of usuraption. The Code had no 
provisions protecting the peasants or insuring them of any 
minimxam share of crops and the section of the Code dealing 
with crop-sharing agreements was weighted in favour of the 
landlords. Tenants v/ere legally liable for keeping harvests 
at a certain level and for carrying out the terms of share-
13 
cropping aoreements, regardless of obstacles. The Code 
assuireci a writ.te?i contract betv;e€;n landlords and tenants, 
but such a conti~act v.'as not in common practice. Generally, 
there were no contracts, and the^  tenants had to comply with 
the landlord's interpretation of an informal oral agreement. 
The only agricultural lav,'s of the 1920s which encouraged 
uioderni^ation, v.-ere the exemption of agricultural machinery 
imports from customs duties and of industrial crops from taxes. 
These lav.'s favoured the development of large-scale capitalist 
farming, but in fact, few mechanized or unified farms had 
begun. Trie old system continued to be highly profitable, as 
the labour was extremely cheap. The exemption of certain 
areas from land taxes did not help peasants who not being 
owners, were no longer directly responsible for these taxes, 
From 193(5 onv.'ards, Reza Shah launched a progrdimme of 
industrialisation wl'iich gave the country its first modern 
:;^ .ctoriGG and railroads. His programme of army modernization 
.-r.d oxiication aT;d social reform continued in the 1930r;. Yet, 
despite some impressive economic achievements, the rjosition 
of the great majority of the population that lined off the 
land did not improve the social structure. The industrialisa-
tion programs itself v/ere lim.ited by the lack of an expanding 
national market, and it provided only a bare beginning towards 
overcoming Iranian backv.'ardness. 
The key to Iranian backv/ardness remained agrarian in 
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nature v;hich eRcoux"agf;'d low productivity, medieval niethods 
and invcsciaent in lanvi and usury, A study of Iranian agrl-
cultur'.:; fficide in 1934 sliows an increase of traditional evils, 
v-ith government supporting, rather than reforming, the old 
systems. According to this detailed work, based on ohserva.-
tion and primary sources, large landlords having several 
villages ov.'ned el:*out one-half the land (estimates for ths 
1950s are usually higher suggesting the continuation until 
recently of forces leading to concentration of landownership). 
There were several methods of exploitation of the peas an tr^ ,', 
all of which have continvied to the present. Direct peasant 
proprietorship was rare, and found mainly on marginal lands« 
Even peasant ov/ners were under the thumb of the local land-
lords, and their economic position and agricultural methods 
\vere quite similar to those of tenants. Middle proprietors 
ov/inc;'onli 'one village were usually descendants of headman and 
other rich peasant and nomads. Even when they lived in the 
village, these x-^ i"oprietors put only 5 to 10 per cent of their 
land under direct cultivation with hired labour and improved 
tools. The majority of the land of middle and large proprietors 
was sharecropped by tenants. Sharecropping contracts were 
nearly alv-'ays verbal, unclear, and designed to keep the 
tenants from accumulating any surplus. 
In a few relatively prosperous areas in north, there was 
another system of exploitation according to which the peasant 
1 Nikki. R. Keddie, op. cit., p. 169, 
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paid a fixed rent. This allowed the peasant to accumulate some 
surplus and was opposed by landlords. The collection of rent 
by an intermediary was much more prevalent and continually 
qrowino. This consisted of a short term contract by renter, 
often of the middle class from a landlox'd, the; renter then 
sub-contracts to the peasants. This system is a logical result 
of the increased holding for which the landlord could not be 
directly responsible. Over half the total land was estimated 
to be rented this way, including most of the state and X'^ a^qf 
land. Renting hurt cultivation, since it encouraged high 
profits on a short-term basis and discouraged any investment 
and improvements. Renters generally treated peasants more 
harshly than did landlords, who had more interests and remained 
alive and active over a longer period. 
By 1930s the peasant village in Iran was a purely agri-
cultural unit. The peasants usually worked for one landlord. 
The land v;as periodically redistributed in most areas, so 
that peasants had no permanent state in any plot. The v;ork 
of the tenants was under the constant supervision of landlord-
appointed agents. The village headman — Kadkhuda ~~ who 
had once represented the villagers to some degree, was now a 
landlord appointee, as was the official in charge of v;ater 
distribution. 
The traditional method of distribution of output was 
based on the 'five in$.)Ut rule'; the inputs being land, water, 
seeds, oxen and labour. The landlord would take the shares of 
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land and v;ater, the peasant would take the share of labour, 
and the two shares of seeds and oxen would go to thoir 
suppliers. In practice, the mode of distribution diverged 
frcin this rule, though not the extent of making it irrelevant, 
primarily because there existed a varied across region. The 
peasant's share varied from one-fifth to seven-eights of the 
crop, depending on v/here he lived and what he supplied. The 
peasant was also to pay feudal dues, state taxes and share of 
local officials, so that his final portion was meagre. 
Peasants' condition was bad throughout the plateau, but 
they were much worse in south cund east than in the north and 
west. Housing and health conditions were quite unsatisfactory 
and inade([ua.te, bread and rice were the only staple foods, 
and peasants were usually hungry. Landlords had in fact 
control ovor the peasants' lives. Settlement of tVie nomads, 
carried ovit by Reza Shah often reduced them to the economic 
level of the peasants, 
Uo agrarian reforms were attempted in the 1930s except a 
fev; technical improvements were made, when the government 
realized that the state land v/ere bringing in a little income, 
they were put on the market in 1934, but the terms on which 
only the large proprietors could afford. A relatively painless 
way to inaugurate land reform through the sale of state land 
to peasants on easy terms was thus avoided. 
A lav; in 1935 stated that the village headmen v;ere the 
landloxrds* representatives and were responsible for lav/ and 
17 
order in the villages. No provision v/as made for peasant 
participation in village administration. A gesture towards 
increasing low agricultural productivity was made by a 1937 
lav/ making landlords responsible for proper cultivation of 
their estates, by Iranian standards, on pain of confiscation 
for neglect. Landlord opposition prevented this lavj from 
being put into effect and the rules for reforcing it were never 
1 
ctrawn up. 
In 1937, in the province of Sistan/ an attempt at land 
x-eforms was made through the sale of state lands to peasants. 
So many complaints came from the peasants about landlords 
flouting the law that Reza Shah set up investigating commissions, 
They took no action to ensure that peasant got the land. Instead, 
landlords, and government officials were able to use their 
pov;er to takeover the state lands. Though various forms of 
pressure, such as v;ithholding needed water from the land. Many 
peasants were expropriated, productivity and living standards 
also fell. Peasants in Sistan v.'ho retained their land, hov/ever, 
said in the m>id-1950s that,bad as their lot was, it was still 
2 
better than it had been before they became owners. 
The only agricultural reforms carried out v/ere aimed at 
increasing productivity. In 1937 law encouraged the improvement 
of badly cultivated land and wasteland through agricultural 
loans. A few agricultural schools and experimental stations 
1 A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia, Oxford Univ. 
Press, Oxford, 1953, pp. 190, 193. 
2 Ibid., p. 252. 
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were founded. These measures had minimal results, and in 
1940 an an\bitiou3 Five Year Plan for agricultural development, 
v;hich aimed at raising productivity substantially, was launched. 
The Plan v.'as interrupted by the V.'ar, but the record of tVic 1930s 
made it doubtful that it could otherwise hav*- reached its aims. 
Agrarian Condition During 40s and 50s: 
The anomalous and economically harmful state of agrarian 
relations became more acute after 1941, when Reza Shah abdicated 
and the Anglo-Russian occupation began. World War II put 
another severe strain on the Iranian economy and brought a nev; 
rise in nationalist and reform movements with revolutionary 
attempts, including agrarian reforms in some areas. As after 
Vvorld V.ar I, the situation led to a politically conservative. 
Western-supported government which repressed its enemies on the 
left '.iiile promising, and to some extent, producing economic 
reforn.s. I^ lany of the trends discussed above continued in the 
post-v.ar period. Vvartime inflation and scarcities meant 
further loss of land and growing debt. The main economic 
burdens on the peasant are debts, rents and taxes and these 
burdens have tended to increase until recently. The processes 
leading to peasant indebtedness are well described by Lambton: 
"The peasant performs all the operations 
concoiTied with the production and disposal of 
his crops himcelf... His need almost always 
forces him to take the price offered however 
disadvantageous it may be, 
"Inadequate communications and cootly means 
19 
of transport greatly add to his costs of 
production and make it difficult for him 
to do anything but sell his goods at the 
near(.:3t market at whatever price is 
offered. The almost permanent state of 
need and the series of temporary arises 
which are the normal concomitant of peasant 
life force hira to dispose of his produce 
immediately after harvest, if it not' 
already pledged before. This means that he 
has no alternative but to sell or barter 
his surplus crops at period when prices are 
lowest... he then has to buy when prices 
are at their peak. 
"It is thus not surprising that debt 
should be one of the curses of Persian 
rural life."l 
A peasant proprieter was almost forced to borrov/ m.oney 
for seeds, tools, livestock and for meeting other current 
expenditure. The tenant, paying exorbitant rents, was also 
forced to borrov^ in order to feed himself and his family. High 
interest rates and low peasant income made it difficult for 
the peasant ever to repay the principal on such loans. These 
high rates not only improvised the peasants, but lured capital 
from productive ventures and directed it towards the economically 
parasitical field of money lending. The fact that investors 
including often turned to unproductive uses of their funds 
does not necessarily mean that they were following traditional 
cultural values irrationally. 
The post-V,ar growth of large landholding increased the 
kind of middleman renter operations described for the 19303. 
I^enters and subcontractors forming a nonproductive hierarchy 
1 Ibid., p. 379-380. 
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over the peasants took over more of the agricultural surplus, 
without doing anything to increase productivity. Renting and 
usury remained most profitable occupations for those in the 
middle class who did not have enough capital to become land-
lords. Even landless sharecroppers increasingly sub-farmed 
their shares to labourers or sharecroppers^who supplied only 
labour, while the original sharecropper generally supplied 
animals and tools,v;hile landlord land and water. 
Until the mid-1950s the lack of capital investment in 
agriculture resulted in a decline in irrigation and hence of 
cultivable land in many areas, increasing population pressure 
and peasant dependence on the good-will of the landlord or 
his agent. Not only was there insufficient annually cropped 
land for the agricultural production, but low yield compounded 
the problem. Despite high migration to the cities, a growing 
number of villagers were reduced to the ranks of landless 
labourers. 
V.ith the growth of mechanization of dry-farming in 1950s 
and 1960s, population pressure on the land has increased in 
the some areas. In Iran machinery has chiefly benefitted 
landlords and hurt peasants who have often been evicted, although 
large tracts of marginal land brought under machine cultivation 
have provided some new employment for labourers. The continua-^ 
tion of a regressive system of primarily indirect taxation has 
increcised burdens on peasantry. 
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profiting from this agrarian situation has been a whole 
galaxy of middle-men, Oversears, village headmen, rich 
peasants, tax officials and moneylenders. The most direct 
beneficiaries of the exploitation of the peasants and 
tribal people have been large landlords and tribal Khans. 
New groups of merchants, contractors, bureaucrats, army 
officers, and village officials bought up land from the 
1920s through the 1950s, and became a new landlord class. The 
landlords were reputed to treat their peasants v;orse than 
before, in order to seek short-term profit at the expense 
of land and peasants. 
Most of the landlords continued to be absentees, concerned 
with receiving the maximum profit without any investment 
after the original land purchase. Coercion and dishonesty 
in elections in the past insured landlord control of the 
Majlis and the purchase of land by government leaders and 
army officers reinforced the ties between landownership and 
political power. 
Between 1906 and 1960 a number of ineffective land-
reform laws were passed (as indicated before), although the 
crovm Land Distribution Programme (1951 to 1963) was claimed 
to be successful. According to official sources, the royal 
estates with their 2,100 villages were sold to their peasant 
cultivators in lots. In order to support their families 
1 The composition of the large landlords group changed sig-
nificantly after VJorld War I. Since Reza Shah confiscated 
the lands of those old families who refused cooperation. 
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and for a price ten times the value of the landowner's harvest 
share which was paid over a 25 year period. Prom 1951 to 1962 
some 517 villages and farms (25 per cent) were redistributed 
and in 1963 a further 289 villages (14 per cent) were given to 
peasants (Table 1,1) . 
The 1951 royal decree was intended to set an example for 
other landed proprietors and in 1966 the government responded 
by preparing for a distribution of the Khaliseh land. Previous 
governmental attempts from 1927 to 1950, was to redistribute 
Khaliseh land in Sistan« Khuzestan, Luristan, Kirmanshan and 
Dasht-e-Moghon had been unsuccessful because the land was 
often misappropriated and subsequently acquired by landowners 
and merchants rather than by the peasants. 
The 20 December 1955 Law for the sale of Khaliseh land 
changed all this, authorising the distribution of all public 
domain except pasture, natural forests and buildings or 
properties needed by government agencies. The law was based 
on the transference of land to its cultivators in raaximxim 
units of ten hectares in irrigated areas and 15 hectares in 
dry fairming regions. Minimum unit size depended on the 
relationship between the cultivable village land area and 
the number of persons eligible to receive it. In the villages, 
where land v/as insufficient only resident farmers received 
it, whereas in larger villages, other groups including the 
resident farmers, male children, and khaushnishins (landless 
peasants) also received the land. 
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Payraeiit vjas to be made over a 20 year period and the 
price \vas fixed according to the land area and fertility 
by a Ministry of Agriculture Provincial Supeirvisory Committee 
and it could not be sold or transferred for ten years. Support-
ing services were to be financed by a cooperative fund to 
which each peasant landowner was to contribute in proportion 
to his annual income. 
This law was only implemented in 1958 and had a very 
limited impact. In 1959 bill for distribution of public domain 
(khaleseh ) was government's second step towards carrying out 
a land distribution. The Bill was passed in National Assembly 
(Maj lis) vjhich was largely made up of landlords without the 
specific opposition by them. According to official records 
of this Bill, 157 out of the total 1/757 kheleseh villages 
were distributed to 8,366 peasants by the end of 1963 (Tables 
1.1 and 1.2). 
Prior to 1960, inflation and balance of payment difficulties 
were beginning to crcat serious political problems. By mid-
1960, government turned to the U.S.A. and International Monetory 
Fund for help. But none of these were prepared to assist unless 
some stabilization and social reform programme in accordance 
v;ith their socio-economic and political interest were adopted. 
Unemployraent and higher cost of living were causing urban 
discontent in many opposing groups. Thus, the Shah seemed 
to be concerned not only with economic crisis, but also v/ith 
the basic social and political problems threating his regime. 
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Also under the pressure, both Internal and external, 
and for seeking prestige on internal as well as external 
levels, the land distrilDution suddenly became the central 
prograirjiie of tVie government at the start of the Third Five 
Year Plan. In fact, the government's Third Five Year Plan, 
v;hich began in September 1962, had not investigated a land 
distribution programme even in the remote future. According 
to Baldium, "when the Third Plan was being written nobody 
guessed that the most important, most expensive programme in 
the agricultural sector would be something not even mentioned 
in the Plan." 
1 G. baldium. Planning and Development in Iran (New Jersey), 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1971, p.53-62. 
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TOTAL 517 42,203 1,99,638 
SOURCE: Bank e Omran va Taavan e Rustai, Bahman, 1336 (Feb. 
1958); Tir 1338 (June, 1959); Khardad 1341 (June, 
1962), Tehran, quoted in C. Gharatchehdaghi, 
Distribution o£ Land in Varamin, Germany: C.V/.Leske 
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LAND TENURE SYSTEM 
Before agrarian reforms in 1960s, about 15,5 million 
people (65 per cent of the total population) lived in 55,000 
villages. Most of the villages were closed to outside influence 
and had a rigid socio-political structure, being owned by a 
relatively small nximber of large landowners. The landlords 
controlled village affairs by employing administrative agents 
to protect their interests as well as to safeguard village 
stability having supervisor,local activities. The villages 
contained some 2.4 million house-holds of peasant sharecroppers 
who comprised the labour force for the cultivation of nearly 
all agricultural land (than estimated to be 11.3 million 
hectares). The average size of farm cultivated by share-
cropping household was calculated to be 47 hectares. 
Broadly speaking, the large landowners fell into four 
main groups: 
1* First group; the first group consisted of members of the 
ruling family and the leading members of the official 
1 H. Khazaneh and A. Sadat, Pishbini va Gozashteh Negary 
Jamiat Shahrl va Rustai Iran ta Sale-e 1990, Tehran, 




classes, both military and civil/ who had obtained 
their land by conquest, inheritance, gift, or 
pvirchase or had acquired it during the course of 
office; they were for the most part absentee 
landlords, 
2" Second group; The second group was made up of tribal 
leaders, who sometimes also belonged to the ruling 
family or to the official classes, and had acquired 
their land in the same v/ay; they were less 
frequently absentees then the first group, but in 
so far as they took part in seasonal migrations, 
were inevitably absent from their landed properties 
for long periods, and in measure, as they became 
settled, tended to became absentee and to be centered 
in the capital or some provincial town. 
2- Third group; The third group consisted of members 
of the religious classes, whose properties derived 
originally mainly from grants and pensions from 
the State, inheritance, purchase and sometimes 
from the usurpation of waqf property; they were 
uiiually absentees. 
^' Fourth group; The fourth group was of merchants, 
whose property derived mainly from purchase and 
sometimes from their transactions as moneylenders; 
their purpose in the acquisition of land was usually 
to gain social prestige, security of investment; 
they too were absentees. 
So, we can divide ownership of land in the following 
categoricis: 
1. Khaleseh (public domain) either confiscated by the State 
in lieu of taxation or aquired by State purchase. 
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2. ATilak-e-Saltanati (CrcfV^ n lands) acquired by the monarch 
and belonging to Royal family, 
3. Waqf (Endov;ment land) alienated to support a foundation 
for a group of 'poor men' or 'an institution of public 
interest for pious purposes (waqf-e-aam) or for the 
donor's family (vja.qf-e-}chas) . 
4. Amlak or amlak khososi (private estates) belonging to 
individuals, families or firms. 
In addition to these groups, there were large numbers of 
smaller landov/ners, v/ho either had acquired land as servants, 
or bailiffs, of the large landowners or else were shopkeepers 
and tradesmen, members of the professional classes, or minor 
government officials, who had inherited land or investment in 
it to supplement their income from other sources. Lastly, 
there was a small class of peasant proprietors, who were 
not, however^ to be found in all parts of the country. 
The distribution of villages in Iran within these 
categories is difficult to establish, because the exact number 
of villages in Iran is still something of a mystery, estimates 
ranging i'roni 48,500 to over 70,000 in addition to 22,000 
mazraeh (independent farms). In 1956 census, however. Crown 
lands contained about 4 per cent of all villages, public 
domain about 10 per cent, endowment lands about 10 per cent 
and priv-ntc holdings the remaining 76 per cent (Table 2.1) . 
According to Hobb's estimate in January 1962, about 90 
per cent ol the arable land in Iran was owned by less than 
5 per cent of the population. 
1 John H.Ho^ ^^ b, "Land Reform in Iran: A Revolution from Above", 
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Baldv.'in mentions that before land refonn, there 
v/ere 200 families owning more than 100 villages each (a total 
of one third of all villages in Iran). Another 10,000 
villages were owned by landlords possessing between 5 to 100 
villages each and approximately 7,000 villages were owned 
by landlords holding between one to five villages each. In 
fact in 1962 an estimated 60 per cent of Iranian farmers owned 
no land and another 23 per cent owned less than one hectare 
of cultivated land. 
There v;ere many kinds of gradations in the size of the 
landed estate, from the district to the village or part of 
landowner. Many of the large landlords were extremely 
wealthy; some of the small landowners, on the other hand, 
were no better off than the more prosperous peasants. In the 
country as a v/hole the dominant form of landownership was 
that, of the large landowner. In those areas in which 
irrigation problems were difficult, as, for example in parts 
of Kcrman where the qanats are long and the cost of their up-
keep heavy, '.he land was mainly, if not entirely, in the 
hands of large landowners. This was also the case.in the 
wheat grov/ing areas of Western Iran. Small landowners 
tended to be found in those districts around the towns which 
were less fertile. Peasant proprietors were on the whole 
confined to remote areas in which agriculture offered a low 
1 George Bald^vin, "Planning and Development in Iran", 
Baltimore, Maryla?id, USA, The John Hopkins Univ. Press, 
London, 1967, p.94. 
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return, as, for example, in mountain districts or on the edge 
of the Central desert. 
It was not unusual for landowner to hold several villages, 
but for a variety of reasons, notably the fragmentation of 
large estates by inheritance, many of the large landed estates 
consisted of parts of different villages. When a large estate 
Was Split up into several shares, these were sometimes 
delimited, but frequently they were held a joint or musha 
tenure by the heirs of the original owner, each having a right 
to a specific share of the capital and the Income but not to a 
Specific portion of the land. In such cases, one of the joint 
holders would usually be responsible for the running the estate, 
Share-cropi^ing system 
From early times the relation between landlord (landowner) 
and ppasant was based on a crop-sharing agreement (mozareh). 
Another type of relationship was based on fixed rent (ejareh). 
In any case the payment to the landlord was usually made 
partly in kind and partly in cash,(Table 2,1) ,C rop~sharing 
agreements, which were recognized both by Islamic law and by 
the Civil Code, were mainly regulated by local customs. Five 
elements — land, watei*, seeds, draft animals, and labour — 
were taken into consideration in fixing the shares of the two 
parties, A groat variety of practices was found influenced 
by the nature of the farming, whether dry or irrigated, by 
the type of irrigation, whether by river, water, qanat or 
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well, and by the type of crop grovm in the case of grain, 
the division of the crops was made on the threshing floor. 
The landlord's share of summer crops,on the other hand, v;as 
usually decided by valuation. 
A third party was sometimes interposed between the 
peasant and the landlord in the person of gavband. He 
provided the draft oxen and was a kind of manager, having an 
agreement with the landlord on the one hand, and with 
peasants on the other. He usually managed several plough-
lands. The gavband was not widely found, however, except 
in some districts near Tehran. 
The sharecropping system was different from region to 
region. In northwest part of Iran, the landlord takes one-
third when he provides land or two-thirds when he provides, 
land, v/ater, oxen and seeds.In the case of unirrigated land, 
he receives only the traditional fifth (panjyak). In 
KeniKinshah the peasant providing labour and seeds and landlord 
paying,the division was equal, where the landlord provides 
only land,the peasant received five-sixths. In southern Iran 
the division by thirds was common, but in Kazeran district, 
the landlord may receive only one-tenth from winter sowings, 
while the tenant pays all expenses, including taxation, the 
cost of reaping, if not borne by the tenant, was reckoned at 
20 per cent, and threshing at 2-4 per cent. 
In some areas, the landlord levied dues in addition to 
34 
a share of the crop, and the peasant was also subject to 
certain personal services which were deregatory to hvunan 
dignity. They were levied for the most part on the plaughland, 
more rarely, they were assessed on the basis of the family or 
as a pool tax. The irsost common was the hability of the peasant 
to transport the landlord, share of the crop from the threshing 
floor to the granry or the local town. To most onerous of 
the personal services was labour service or bigari. 
State lands (khaleseh) and waqf lands were for the most 
part leased. The relation of peasants on such land to the 
tenant, was virtually the same as landowner on the private 
property. The administration of private or personal wagf 
differ little from that of private landed estates. Frequently, 
one of the beneficiaries would administer a private waqf on 
behalf of the others. 
Irrigated garden lands were leased on'different conditions 
from plaugland. A cash rent was usually paid for the land and 
water, but differed little from that of private landed estate. 
It must noticed as most of the agricultural land of the 
country was held by large landowners, the state, and religious 
endowment, large scale farming have to be practiced, but it 
was not the case. In real practice a general control or 
supervision was often exercised by the landowners. Seeds 
were sometimes purchased and the crop marketed centrally, 
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Nevertheless, in the main the large estates, like the small 
ones, v/ere run on the basis of plou^land or the peasant 
holding. Thus none of economic advantages of large land-
ownership applied. Methods of cultivation were primitive 
and combined witli unfavo\arable physical conditions, resulted 
in poor yields. A few landowners specially from about 1952 
on, began to turn to the use of tractors and combines in the 
grain-grov/ing areas, but their number was small except in 
Turkomansaray. 
The amount of the crop available for sale or barter was 
usually extremely small. In the case of the crop-sharing 
peasant, what remained to him after the deduction of the 
landlord's share and the payment of various dues was often 
insufficient to maintain his family until the next harvest. 
The peasant usually performed all the operations concerned 
with the production and disposal of his crops himself. He 
was extremely sensitive to seasonal and other variations in 
price. His poverty prevented the accumulation of reserves. 
He was thus seldom in a position to drive a bargain, but was 
forced by need to take whatever price was offered, however, 
disadvantageous it might be. Inadequate transport made it 
difficult for him to sell his goods any where but at the 
nearest market. The almost permanent state of need and 
temporary crimes that were the normal concomitants of peasant 
life forced him to dispose of his products immediately after 
harvest, if it was not already pledged before. Barter system 
38 
was common, specially v/ith travelling merchants and, local 
shopkeepers. 
The peasant v/as constantly in need of money for capital 
requirements to replace livestock and agricultural implements, 
and for cxirrent expenses such as the provision of seed. For 
these proposes he often had to borrow. Often, he had to 
borrow merely to feed his family. In such cases, the harvest 
sometimes sufficed only to pay off his debts, in bad years, 
it did not even do this, and so that peasant remained permanently 
in debt. Loans were normally raised on the security of the 
next harvest. Rate of interest were high. In some cases, but 
by no means all, landowners gave advance to the peasants 
working on their land. Terms varied and were often disadvan-
tageous to the peasants. 
Security of tenure 
Security of tenure is the matter of vital concern to the 
peasant. Some slight security was provided to the peasant in 
Iran under law regarding crops which he might have sown, but 
he did not have real security of tenure in pra'tice in most of 
the areas. In fact, the landlord (or lessee) could turn 
peasant out at will except in some areas. However, custom 
gave the peasant a little protection in some areas and laid 
down certain rules. For example in Kerman the peasant's share 
1 For example in some areas if a landowner was given permission 
to a peasant to cultivate lucerne, it was tacitly recognised 
that the peasant had a right to the land as long as roots of 
the crops remain in the ground, which with some types of 
lucome may be seven years. 
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of crop v/as divided into three parts known as abdar, kishtdar 
^^'^ bardar. Thus if peasant v/as turned out even on Iranian 
New Year, he was entitled to one-third of his full share. 
This in tvirn was recovered by the landowner from the peasant 
who took over. It was alleged that the peasant in Kerrnan 
could only be turned out at the New Year (i.e., March or in 
September to October) . 
The peasant enjoyed certain customary rights of occupation 
in some areas. In Azarbayjan, such rights were known as 
Jiver and represerted a peasant who brought land under culti-
vation on the landlord's estate and worked on it for some years. 
For most of the parts, these rights were acquired by virtue 
of the labour which the peasant had put into the land and 
referred to fruit-trees, vines, which had been planted by 
the peasant, but not to the land itself. If the landowner 
v;anted to evict a peasant who had jiver rights, he had to pay 
him compensation, the amount of which was decided by argument. 
Further if the landlord sold his land, the new owner was not 
able to deprive the peasant of his right. These rights moreover 
could be transferred by the peasant to a tl.ird person. They 
could also be registered, in which case they were no longer 
merely customary, but legally recognised. In a few areas 
around Tehran, similar occupancy rights were found. In 
Khuzistan and Pars provinces, generally the peasant, had no 
1 Abdar means the return due for preparation of land for 
cultivation, Kishtdar means the return due for sowing and 
tending of crop, and Bardar, means due for reaping and 
harvesting of crop. 
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security of tenure. In Mazandran any clearing made in the 
forest,by custom the person who performed this work was 
entitled for some rights. This right so acquired was knovjn 
as haqqe-taber tarashl^ that is, the right derived from the 
falling of trees. In some areas peasants who cultivate the 
arable land of a village on a crop-sharing basis or figainst 
the payment of a rent, enjoyed certain privileges over these 
inhabitants of the village who were not crop-sharing peasants 
or tenants, who were known as "khushnishin". The fanners, 
who hold garden tend to hold them on more favourable terms. 
For example, in Lakhan (Arak), the crop-sharing peasants paid 
dues of Rials 6 per vine and the khushnishin paid Rials 50 
in 1945. 
Further, although the peasant had no right to transmit 
his holding by inheritance (except in few areas) . If the 
holder of a plough-land or a sharer of the water died, it 
usually happened that the landlord made an agreement with 
one of his sons, who continued to cultivate the land which 
his father cultivated before him. Moreover, where the 
peasant was able to transmit his holding by inheritance, 
since the holding was a unit which in theory could support 
and be cultivated by a family, the usual practice was for one 
member of the family to succeed to the holding, and to 
work it on behalf and with the help of the others. Subdivision 
beyond a certain limit v;as avoided in the same way as it was 
avoided in the peasant-proprietor areas. Evictionr although 
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the peasant had for the most part no legal security of tenure, 
was not usual. The reasons for this were probably tv^o-fold. 
In the first place tradition was strong, and was not the 
custom for the landowner to turn his peasants out,in the 
second place, the pressure on the available land was not great 
except in certain area. In some places, there was a shortage 
rather than superfluity of peasant. In west of Iran in neigh-
bourhood of Kirmanshah, on the borders of Kurdistan, there 
was a shortage of peasants and the land was not cultivated 
to its full capacity. 
So far as security of tenure concern for most part of 
the country, however, the peasant tenure was not guaranteed, 
even for a period, much less permanently. He might have 
spent his v/hole life time in one village, but the land which 
he cultivated v;ould vary annually or periodic redistribution 
v;as made by lot. 
Chapter III 
LAND REFORM IN IRAN SINCE 1962 
AND ITS ASSESSMENT 
Mohammad Reza Shah, who ascended to modernize the 
country through industrialisation and bring about a complete 
•White Revolution Programme* to bring about revolutionary-
change by touching every aspect of life of Iranians. This was 
very ambitious programme to bring about revolutionary change 
through bloodless revolution. He also paid attention to the 
agricultural sector under this programme. This programme was 
1 
split into twelve points which are as follows: 
1. Abolition of the peasant-landlord tenure system and the 
re-distribution and sale of the peasants (on easy terms) of 
all landed estates in excess of one village. 
2. Public ownership of all forest lands of the nation for 
the purpose of conservation, proper management and better 
utilisation of their resources. 
3. Public sale of state-owned industrial enterprises to 
private corporations and individuals to raise funds to finance 
agrarian reconstruction and development programme creating 
profitable investment opportunities for former landlords in 
1 12 Points for Progress - Iran's White Revolution, 2nd Ed., 
Illustrated by All Massoudi, Ministry of Information, Tehran, 
Iran, October 1968, p.l. 
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particular and for small savers in general. 
4. Incentives for increased labour-productivity by means 
of profit sharing arrangements between industrial workers 
and management to the extent of 20 per cent of net corporate 
earnings. 
5. The amendment of the electoral law so as to grant voting 
and other related rights to women, extending equal and 
universal suffrage to all Iranian citizens regardless of sex, 
6. The formation of education corps from High School teachers 
and multipurpose village-level workers in rural areas, 
combating illiteracy, superstition and ignorance. 
7. The formation of Health corps from physicians and 
dentists to bring free medical attention to rural areas, 
improving sanitary conditions and health standards. 
8. The formation of development and agricultural extension 
corj5s to modernize the physical structure of the villages 
and help farmers acquire new skills necessary to raise farro 
productivity. 
9. The establishment of village courts to hear minor local 
cases so that they may be settled programatically, equality 
and speedily bringing the rule of enlightened modern law to 
the villages. 
10. Nationalisation of country's water resources for the 
purpose of conservation of fresh water supply through modern 
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scientific practices assuring judicious use of water in 
agriculture. 
11. An extensive reconstruction programme in urban and 
rural areas to improve living standards of the whole nation. 
12. A complete administration and educational reorganisation 
of government agencies to meet the more exacting requirements 
of the time. 
The systematic land reform programme was launched in I tan 
when the government enacted the Land Reform Act on 9th January, 
1962. The measures were introduced for the land reform through 
the legal provisions of this Act in the country. It is thus 
marXed as the first phase of the land reforms. Later in 
1963 some additional articles were also passed by the Parliament 
in connection with the land reforms. Land reforms have been 
made in the light of not only Land Reform Act but also in 
the light of incorporation of these Articles. This has 
been considered as the second phase. The third phase covers 
the period from the date of the introduction of the Bill in 
1968. We v7ould, therefore, like to study the land reform 
programme in the country under these three phases. 
FIRST PHASE 
After the special organisation for land distribution 
programme launched by Ministry of Agriculture in 1961, the 
First Phase of the land distribution covered the period 
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(1962-64). According to this law, all land holdings of over 
one village were to be transferred to government for resale 
to the peasants. Article 2 of the law provided "The upper 
.2 limit of real property per person shall be a "six dang" village' 
that the landlords may choose among their villages to remain 
in their possession. The rest shall be distributed in accordance 
with present law. Excluded from the law were orchards, tea 
plantations, woodlands, homesteads and mechanized farming areas 
using wage labour. The exemption of mechanised farms was appa-
rently intended to encourage their expansion and to encourage 
improvements in the level of farm technology. 
Compensation was paid for surplus land by the Land Refotm 
Organisation in amounts depending on taxes paid and a multi-
plier. The multiplier taken into account for determination 
of certain factors such as the distance frcan village to 
city, village revenue and peasant/landlord crop division 
patterns. In general, compensation was around 100 to 180 
times of the average of last three years' tax payment prior 
to 1962. Compensation was paid over 15 years in annual 
instalments corresponding to 7 per cent of the principal sum 
plus 6 per cent interest by Agricultural Bank. However, 
payments could only be used to purchase shares in government 
factories, to pay taxes, or as a security against bank credit 
1 The original law stipulated 1,000 and 2,000 hectares for 
irrigation and dry land respectively. 
2 In Persian law, any piece of real estate is divided into 
six shares of parts, known as dangs. The area of the one 
village which the landowner could retain would include six 
dangs,or he might retain parts in several villages, 
amounting to six dangs in all 
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for investment in mining industry or agriculture. 
The suitable recipients (who had to be members of a '^  
local cooperative society) for expropriated land were defined 
as zari-e-sahib nasaq, peasant sharecroppers, who provided 
a factor of production in addition to their own labour, their 
heirs if death occured v-^ ithin 12 months of redistribution; 
other sharecroppers, agricultural labourers and non-farming 
villagers who wished to become farmers, although in reality 
the beneficiaries were nearly always former sharecroppers 
and their heirs. This system of allocation did not disturb the 
field layout of the village, where each peasant cultivator 
held ownership rights on a musha (joint ownership of land 
shares) basis. The Land Reform Programme actually gave him 
a land title and not unconditional absolute land ownership 
rights. 
The price paid by recipients was the government purchase 
price plus a maximum 10 per cent commission over 15 years 
period. The redistribution process was thus substantially 
self-financing. Holdings could not be transferred or sold 
until the full price had been paid. 
Any land transaction effected after the approval of the 
lav; v;as declared null and void and landlords who refused to 
prepare a declaration on their land-holdings or who filled 
in false declarations were fined 1,00,000 rials. 
The 1962 J lav/ first carried out in the north and centre. 
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where it started a real change in the land system. The shock 
tactics succeeded upto a certain point. During the first 
drive the power of the landlords was broken in the north and 
shaken in the centre, the south and east were not affected. 
According to official statistics, upto September 1963, 
8,042 villages (16 per cent of the total) wholly or in part, 
had been purchased from landlords, and 271,076 peasants families 
had received conditional titles of ownership, 2,088 cooperative 
societies had been set up in the villages with membership of 
243,302 persons and a capital of 250 million rials. Most of 
this action had been taken immediately after passing of the 
law, 7,500 villages (wholly or in part) were purchased and 
distributed within the first seven months-quick work by any 
standard. Land was granted to the peasants in conditional 
title to a fraction of the land of the village (usually not to 
a specific area) according to the area which they previously 
cultivated as occupying tenants. Full title was granted when 
the purchase price was fully paid. 
After the initial shock, landowners were able to use two 
common methods of evasion: transfer of property and pressure 
on the peasants. Under the 1962 law, transfers of large 
estates were illegal after date of enactment but antedating 
must have been possible (some landowners presumably carried 
out transfers to members of their families as a result of 
the 1960 law, which allowed transfers within two years after 
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enactment'. The second method of evasion was to evict peasants 
from the holdings which they occupied by forcing them to sign 
a document stating that they were agricultural labourers (i.e., 
not crop-sharing peasants), thus renouncing their claims to 
land under the law, even when these claims were in process of 
settlement. Both of these methods have been used in India to 
prevent enforcement of ceilings and tenancy ligislation, in 
Iran they were not used until the reform had already been partly 
enforced. 
However, the first phase did not adequate measures in 
acquiring the additional villages for landlords or the extra 
total area occupied by them, limiting landownership to one 
village throughout the country meant that in places where 
landlord had decided to retain one of his villages, where the 
old landlord-peasant relationship remained as strong as ever. 
Majority of peasants were shocked by this programme 
because more than 75 per cent of irural families were not 
benefitted under this law. And according to law, 930,000 
hectares of garden, 1,000 hectares of mechanized large-scale 
farm, and 1,000 villages were not subjected to the land 
distribution programme. In case of personal waqf, the maximum 
area from v;hich clergy could draw revenue was limited to 
one village. 
Under the first phase of land reform programme only 9,000 
villages (about 16 per cent of the total) were affected while 
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the status of the vast majority of peasants remained unchanged. 
It was not wise to ignore the difference created among those 
who received land and the majority of the peasants who had 
been left without land. Under the phase 4,070 villages and 
farms in whole were bought from landlords and 11,760 villages 
and farms, in part, v/ere bought from landlords at 10,350 
million rials. These were sold to 707,000 peasant families. 
Therefore, 1962 villages and farms (1,576 in whole and 386 in 
pairt) of public domain were sold to the 91,185 peasant families 
at 1,356 million rials. The government, therefoj^ -e, further 
amended the Land Reform Laws through the "Additional Articles" 
(17th January, 1963) which,when put into effect in Pebiruary, 
1965, formed the second phase of the land reform. 
SECOND PHASE 
In 1963 first of all three Articles v/ere incorporated in 
the Land Reform Act 1962, and later two more Articles v/ere 
passed and influded laying down the procedure by government 
under the Law and they began to be applied in 1965. The new 
land ceiling was defined as from 20 to 150 hectares. The 
maximum areas laid down in different regions are as follows: 
1. Rice land in Gilan and Mazendran 20 hectares 
2. Environs of Tehran, Varamin, Damavand, Rei, 
Shamiran, and Karaj 30 hectares 
3. Other land in districts listed in 2 above 70 hectares 
4. Environs of provincial capital except 
Kerman, Sanandaj and Zahidan 50 hectares 
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5. Districts of Gurgan, Gvunbad, the 
Mughan steppe, and land other than 
rice in Gilan and Mazanderan 40 hectares 
5. Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchistan 150 hectares 
7. All ov>.i-v voviions 100 hectares 
Annexed Articles decreed the owners of non-mechanised land 
which were not subjected to the purchase by the government in 
the first phase land distribution must dispose of or manage 
their land in one of the three ways as followsj 
1. Rent the land on a 30 year lease to the occupying 
peasants for a cash rent, based on the average income 
received by him for the preceding three years, this 
rent to be subject to revision every five years, 
2. Sell the land to the occupying peasants by mutual 
agreement. 
3. Divide the land between himself and the peasants in 
a same proportion as the crop was divided under the 
traditional crop-sharing (that is to say, if the 
peasant's customery share was two-fifths of the 
produce, the landlord should grant two-fifth of the 
land to the peasants at the highest rate for the 
region in ten equal annual instalments). Water rights 
were to be assigned with the land divided between the 
two parties. Credit was to be supplied to assist 
peasant purchase. Mechanized land within the village 
was exempted from the provision of the Articles. 
In the case of yaqf land, an important category only 
Course 1 was permitted, with a leasehold tenancy of 99 years 
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and as a result conditions of tenancy have improved on land 
in this fonn of tenure. 
The Annexed Articles also opened new loopholes for 
evasion of the original law. In Article 22, had decreed that 
no landlord had the right to expel on any grounds a peasant 
from a village or land which he cultivated, or to prevent him 
from cultivating and it had allowed exemption from the 
provision of the law for land cultivated by machinery only 
if it was so cultivated at the date that the lav; came Into 
force. But a note to the first of the Annexed Articles 
allowed landowners in the village retained under the first 
phase to keep on area of land under mechanized cultivation 
upto maximujn of 500 hectares. This meant that landJ.ord could 
plough once with a tractor* perhaps borrowed for. the occasion 
and claim tliat cultivation was mechanized, they could then 
evict peasants from land (as they have since done on a large 
scale around Tehran and Isfahan and in the south). 
So the Annexed Articles offered uncertain benefits to 
the peasants and certain benefits to landowners. 
The regulation for implementation of these Articles was 
issued at the middle of 1964, The regulation offered the 
landowners two other good possible courses of action, in 
addition to three methods listed above. 
4, The formation of an agricultural \init with agreement 
of the majority of the peasants and landowners to be run 
as a unit by a managing committee consisting of three 
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persons, one representing the peasants, one the 
landowner or land-owners and a third being chosen 
by mutual agreement by the two parties. 
The shares of each person in the total income are 
to be determined by their ownership of the different 
agricultural elements in accordance with traditional 
system (fifth part rule). Thus they will receive the 
same share as in past, 
5. Buying the peasants rights and employing them as wage 
labourers. That is completely reversal of the original 
law. 
Under the second phase in case of leased land (73.5 %) 
232,366 landlords let their lands to 1,243,961 tenant peasants, 
and in case of sold land (1.2 %) 3,202 landlords sold their 
lands to 55,953 peasants families; and in case of divided 
lands (8.0 %) 25,359 landlords divided their land with 157,598 
peasants in proportion to the share croppers respective 
share of crops? and in case of the joint-stock units (13.2 % ) , 
41,615 landlords had set up joint stock units with 81,292 
peasants families in 3,952 villages. In case of the land sold 
by peasant (4.0 %) , 13,374 peasants sold their right to 
landlords. About 8,564 farms and villages of public endowment 
were let for 99 years to 137,173 peasant families and 957 
farms and villages of private endowment were let to 35,931 
peasant families, and 9,544 villages were exampted from 
distribution (mechanized farms 1,225, unutilized villages 
6,236, and villages dominated with garden and tea plantation 
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2,083). As result of the second phase, implemented in 54,833 
villages and 21,850 farms, only 213,551 peasant families got 
titles of the land and 13,374 peasant families lost their 
position as a farmer. 
To sum up the second phase of the programme did not sustain 
the aims of the first phase, it has suffered from many complex 
and, extremely favourable attitude that they took for the 
landlords. The programme did not concerTied with future form 
of the country's farm organisation and rational farm size, as 
objective usually associated with land distribution, e.g., 
measures to pursue the consolidation of dispersed land by 
the collective action of the farmers and to prevent the wide 
gap between the size of distribution of land among the peasants 
from less than 0.5 hectare to 100 hectare per family. 
It has been found in many parts of the country that the 
dispersion of the parcels of land under one peasant's right 
have reached to 27 percels in one village. For example, in 
irural area of Kashan, south of Tehran, 18.3 per cent of the 
farmers' lands are connected with 81.7 per cent of the 
farmers' farm are dispersed in many parts of the village. In 
average, each family has plots of land in various places. In 
Meshhad, northeast of Iran, 9,0 per cent of the farmers have 
2 
a connected farm and 75.0 per cent dispersed in many places. 
This dispersion has been the worst obstacle to the modernization 
1 K. Vadii, Mpghadameu bar Rusta-Shanasyi-e-Iran (An Introduc-
tion to the Rural Identification of Iran), Tehran: Dehkhoda 
publications, 1973, p.79. 
2 Ibid. 
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of the agriculture in Iran, under the serious shortage problem 
of water. The system of "traditional right to cultivation-
Nasaq" has been the real cause of this dispersion and the 
land didtribution programme could not solve this problem. 
Therefore, whenever a person visits the farmer in village 
he takes him to many places to show the plots that are 
located in different places. 
With regard to the effect of the second phase, according 
to reports the majority of the landlords (73 per cent) chose 
the first course of action as laid down in the Annexed 
Articles that is the conversion of share-cropping to the 
fixed rental tenancy, some thing far from the slogan of "the 
land for cultivator". There have been many disputes over the 
fixation of the rent. The basis on which the rent was fixed 
was not favourable to the peasants. The rent might have been 
more than the share of the crop which formerly was paid by 
the peasants, because in case of loss, the cultivator v/as 
responsible and he had to bear the loss. 
The second alternative v/as most favourable case for the 
peasants but it covered only 1.2 per cent, an insignificant 
portion of the landlords chose to sell their land to their 
tenants. Even in this case it was alleged that the land had 
been sold to people who were not occupying tenants, or that 
peasants had been wrongfully excluded. 
The Third alternative, so called transferring of the 
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ownership of a parcel of his lands to his Raiyat in proportion 
to the raiyat's respective shares of crops, was chosen by 8.0 
per cent. The results were often worse for the peasants. It 
was chosen by landlords because the existing crop-sharing 
agreement gave the peasants a small share, often amounting 
to maximiim of only one-fifth of the product. As the peasants 
cannot live on the small area which corresponds to those shares, 
they continued to work under tenancy agreement on the landlord's 
land, but without security. On the other hand, "the great 
mistake, however, in allowing this course of action at all 
is that it overlooked the possibility of the landowner taking 
over the water supplies. Even if he retains only a minor 
proportion of the land, he can,perfectly legally, sink a deep 
well which dries up the water in the ganat or qanats supplying 
the rest of the land. In this case, the land reform, originally 
intended to better the lot of the peasants, may in fact 
considerably worsen it." 
The fourth alternative, to set up joint farming units, was 
chosen by 13 per cent of the landlords. This was the other 
alternative most favourable to the landlords, because they 
could not envisage the peasants as independent and the old 
system of non-participatory agricultural organisation ruled 
by landlords. The fourth alternative, the 'agricultural unit', 
was the subject of much controversy among senior land reform 
1 Warriner, 'Land Reform in Principal and Practice, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, Oxford University, London, 1969, p.131. 
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officials, several of whom were opposed to its inclusion 
in the law of 1964, on the grounds that it would perpetuate 
the old system, while other wished to make it the only 
course to landowners, because they could not envisage the 
peasants as independent producers. It has been very rarely 
selected outside the provinces of Khorasan and Kerman, where 
it has been chosen in a few villages, as a rule those with a 
large number of small landowners, whose status is not much 
higher than that of the peasants, and in some villages on the 
edge of the central desert where economic conditions are very 
insecure. As to how these units would be managed there was 
uncetainty, for no regulations covering their organisation 
had been issued at the end of 1965. It was, however, intended 
to channel loans from Agricultural Credit Bank direct to those 
units, so that no cooperative organisation would be needed. 
As Lambton pointed out "it was an ill-thought out method 
of settlement... Agricultural unit does not have legal 
personality and a managing committee seldom has effective 
existence... There have also been cases in different parts 
of the country of landlords putting pressure on the peasants, 
by various methods such as with-holding water, in the hope of 
forcing them to sell their rights". 
The fifth alternative, by which tenants could sell their 
cultivation rights to the landlords, was chosen by 4 per cent 
1 Lambton, A.K.S,, "Rural development and land reform in 
Iran", A paper presented to the CENTO Symposium on Rural 
Development, held in Tehran, 1963, p.148-149. 
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of the landlords. The danger of this alternative was 
obvious. As it was found in many parts of the country, 
landlords' collusion with government officials, could coerce 
peasants into selling their rights. As VJarriner noted, "In 
the Darab district of Fars province in south part of Iran, 
collusion between landlords and local reform officials had 
resulted in about 5,000 peasants selling their rights because 
they had been given to understand that they had no alternative. 
In other investigation, it was found that in northeast part of 
Iran (Turbat-i-Haydarii) in 1965, large number of peasants 
were selling their rights, some under pressure, but many — 
out of poverty — because their holdings were too small and 
2 
too poor to afford a living. 
The provisions with regard to the exemption of mechanised 
land both in the first and second phases of the programme were 
the other occasions for much abuse. Attempts were frequently 
made to claim that the land was mechanized when In fact was 
not, or it had only been mechanised after the programme 
began. Mechanised farm was defined simply in the law as,the 
farms which were being ploughed by tractors. Therefore, in 
the event of the land distribution programme landlords tried 
to buy one or two tractors for hundred hectars of land to be 
able to adopt this formal position in the lav/. 
The process of the second phase of the programme did not 
1 Warriner, op.cit,, 1969, p.132. 
2 Lambton, A.K.S., Rural Development and Land Reform in Iran, 
op,cit., 1963, p,148. 
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satisfy the wishes of an overwhelming majority of the 
tenants to gain the ownership of the land cultivated by 
them, on the other hand the subdivision and the unequal 
distribution of land between peasants continued to be the 
more pressing matter. But government from the beginning 
was not concerned with the equal distribution of the land. 
Under the procedure, the ownership of the land was granted 
to the tenants in conditional title in proportion to the land 
previously cultivated by them under the share-cropping system. 
Thus, majority of the rural people (35-40 per cent) who 
worked in farming as an agricultural labourer (Khushnishin) 
but had no cultivation right on the land were completely 
ignored under first and second phases of the land distribution 
programme. 
THIRD PHASE 
Concerning the sub-division of holding the government 
instead of facilitating the cooperative farming by voluntarily 
collective action of farmers, decided to establish state-
controlled, large scale agricultural organisation, called the 
farm corporation, comprising many villages. This can be 
called as the first measure of the third phase of the land 
distribution programme. The second measure under the third 
phase was a bill submitted to the Majlis in 1968. According 
to this law, all kinds of tenancies were abolished except the 
land owned by waqfs. In other cases, the course had been 
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adopted as such that firstly all estates leased their lands 
to tiie tenants for thirty years, secondly those who had 
already chosen to set up joint units under the second phase, 
thirdly, estates whose owners had not yet adopted a form of 
settlement, and fourthly the estates of unknown ownership were 
required either to sell all their lands to the tenants on the 
price to be determined by 12 times the annual rent, or divide 
the land between two parties in the proportion as the crop 
was divided under the crop-sharing agreement. The peasants 
receiving land under this law as the first phase were required tc 
join the local cooperative society if and when this was set 
up by the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation. 
Under third phase,law stipulated the sale of the rented 
land under the legal status of 316,372 landlords and 1,154,578 
peasant families was clarified. In connection with the law 
stipulating the division of the land between peasant and land-
lords. The legal status of 35,400 landlords and 110,347 
peasant families was clarified. As a result of this phase, 
the legal status of 1,264,925 peasant families was clarified. 
Consequently, under the phases of land distribution in Iran, 
out of 3,600,000 rural families in 1973, 2,267,661 (63 per 
cent) of the peasant families obtained land or their legal 
status was clarified upto the March 1974. 
In 1971, finally the government announced the land dis-
tribution programme to be closed, while many problems of the 
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land ownership and tenure system remained untouched. 
The results obtained during the first phase —• upto March 
1972 — are summarised in table 3.1. 
Data on the second phase are too vague to make any 
effective analysis, mainly because of the complex arrangements 
for disposal of land. However/ it seems that about two thirds 
of the landowners based their holdings for a 30 year period 
thus retaining control over their land. Ajami indicates that 
72 per cent of estates (villages) were leased and 18 per cent 
were c^ rganised into joint fanning units, 6,0 per cent were 
divided betv;een landowners and only 1.4 per cent were sold 
outright to peasant cultivators. Peasant rights were sold to 
2 landowners in 2.6 per cent of the estates. 
The vast majority of both public and privately owned 
estates were similarly leased, the farmer for 99 years and 
the latter for' 30 years. 
Under the third phase, leased land was sold outright to 
peasant tenants, and a comparatively small percentage of 
landlords divided their holdings with their tenants. 
Major steps were taken by the Government along with the 
implementation of land reforms including the establishment: 
1 R.R. Hoeppner, "Aspekte der Agrarreform Irans" (Aspects 
of Agrarian Reform in Iran), Orient, Vol. 14, 1973, 
pp. 37-40. 
2 Ajami, "Land Reform and Modernisation of the Farming 
structure in Iran", Oxford Agrarian Studies, Vol. 2, No,2, 
1973, p.6. 
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T a b l e 3 . 1 
VILLAGE AND VILLAGERS AFFECTED BY THE 
FIRST PHASE OF LAND REFORM 
I t e m 1972 
VILLAGES 
T o t a l number of v i l l a g e s . . . 5 5 , 0 0 0 
V i l l a g e s e x e m p t e d , , Q Q 
( m e c h a n i s e d f a rming) * * * ' 
Number of v i l l a g e s a f f e c t e d . . . 1 4 , 2 9 0 
- in whole ... 3,887 
- in part ... 10,403 
Nximber of villages „ -.QO C 
equivalents 
Per cent of total ... 16.5 
PEASANT WITH LAND RIGHTS 
Total number ... 2,530,000 
Number of beneficiaries ... 690,500 
Percent of total ... 27.3 
Source: Salmanzadeh, C , Agricultural change and 
rural society in southern Iran, Middle East 
and North African Studies Press Limited, 
Cambridge, England, 1980, p.66. 
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1. Rural cooperative societies, 
2. Agro-business, 
3. Farm corporations, and 
4. Production cooperatives. 
1. Rural Cooperative Societies 
The rural cooperative societies were established at the 
start of the land reform. The aims of these rural cooperative 
societies were stated to include: (i) provision of credit 
facilities because cooperativeswere partially set up as a 
channel for supply of credit. The credit was alloted at a 
relatively low rate of interest. They provide more facilities 
establishing the Agricultural Credit Bank which was later 
converted into Agricultural Cooperative Bank, (ii) constmction 
of warehouses in different parts of the country for storing 
and distributing consumer goods, agricultural inputs, and 
agricultural products, and (iii) to protecting the farmers 
from the unfair dealings with the middleman. Farmers used 
to sell their surplus production in the major wholesale 
markets and purchase their necessities from cooperatives. 
In 1972, there were about 8,600 cooperatives which were 
established to cover 2 to 40 villages. The average member 
ship stood at 200, The policy was to appoint the managing 
directors from among the residents of the villages. This 
policy avoided competition and brought mutual understanding 
among the peasants. 
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At the end of Fourth Development Plan (1968-73) there 
were 12 rural cooperative unions. Their membership increased 
frcxn 5,985 to 7,961 while the capital rose from Rls. 280 
million (about $ 3.69 million) to Rls. 1.6 billion (about 
$ 21.11 million). These unions were located at the cities 
(shahrestan). Each union covered an average membership of 
about 60 cooperatives. 
In 1973, with a view to efficiency a plan was made to 
amalgmate three to four societies to form a single society 
(the Plan also envisaged extending cooperative facilities to 
the areas which were not hitherto served). 
During the Fifth Development Plan (1973-78), about 208 
rural cooperative societies were created. The total number 
of rural cooperatives reached to 2,025 units. The membership 
of rural coopei-ative societies increased to 9,19,000. During 
1978-79, 17 new rural cooperative societies were formed, while 
their total membership increased by 39,000 persons. The total 
nvimber of rural cooperative societies also increased, reaching 
to 2,942 during the period. 
The Central Organisation for Rural Cooperation (CORC) 
operated with its offices both at the provinces (Ostan) and 
cities (shahrestan) . A person who has passed high school has 
been selected and nine months' extra training was given at the 
Karaj and Shiraz Universities. He was appointed to effectively 
1 Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, Tehran, 
1973, p.68. 
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supervise for two to three villages. However, before the 
establishment of rural cooperatives, the continuing lack 
of finance pressed the farmers to rely on private sources 
and also their landlords (mallk) . The peasants had to sell 
their crops as part of the loan agreements. Thus, falling 
victims of exploitation. 
2. Agro-business 
In 1968, a law was enacted to help tackle the problem of 
water scarcity and soil management. The law empowered the 
Ministr^^ of Energy to establish agro-industry companies. The 
government invited foreign companies and granted them 30 years' 
concession to make the maximum utilisation of v/ater resources 
in the cultivation of land. The companies from the United 
States of America and United Kingdom, with sufficient finance 
and technical assistance arrived to develop the land for 
intensive mechanised farming. The whole programme was under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and National 
Resources. 
However, the land using facilities provided by dams or 
groups of well was known as 'Agricultural Poles Development'. 
These pole covered a very wide field including sericulture, 
poultry fanning, fruit and vegetable production and processing, 
oilseeds production and processing, production of seeds and 
1 Sometimes knv;on as agro-industries. It has also been 
used to include meat and dairy complexes and large scale 
processing units. 
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flowers, and food industries. The areas of Fars, Kurdestan, 
Lorestan and Azerbaijan were selected as major poles for 
development. 
3. Farm Corporations 
The third model is farm coirporation which is based on 
amalgamation of small farms with a view to (i) improve 
management, (ii) maximise use of farm machinery, (iii) intro-
duction of scientific methods of agriculture, (iv) increase 
in water supply, (v) expansion of cultivated area, and (vi) 
improvement of marketing operations. 
In February 1968, a law for the formation of farm 
corporations with 27 units covering 164 villages and 105,848 
hectares of land out of which 37,801 hectares were under 
cultivation. There were 9,170 shareholders. The policy 
intended to establish a total of 143 corporations. The 
corporations were designed to pool small and fragmented 
holdings for efficient use of agricultural inputs — water, 
pesticides, and machinery — to increase the yield and output, 
and to prevent further fragmentation. Consequently, they were 
established first in areas of small subsistence farming, so 
that the government could render an integrated service for 
increasing production. 
The Farm Corporations have been functioning as Joint Stock 
1 Decade of the Revolution (1963-1973), Resurrection of a 
Nation: A Miracle of Leadership, Echo Print, Tehran, Iran, 
p. 22. 
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Corupanies. The corporations used farmers' lands against 
payment. The amount of share to be paid to the peasants 
was measured on the basis of the value of land. However, 
farmers were required to participate by renting and even by 
selling their land to those farmers who were interested to 
join the Corporations. Membership was opened only to those 
peasants who got land through the land reforms. 
It may be noted that a Farm Corporation could be estab-
lished when a majority of peasants were willing to join the 
Corporation. 
The Industries Corporations and Farm Corporations have 
been functioning both similar to each other as regard to their 
operation and management. But, farm corporation's managers, 
technicians and accountants wefe being recruited by the 
government. The government also financed the irrigation, 
drainage, roads-building and other village infrastructure. 
It also provided facilities for technical training. Similarly, 
soft loans were provided for Investment in mechanisation, 
construction of warehouses, machinery shed, housing and current 
operational expenses on the basis of approved annual plan. 
During the Fifth Development Plan (1973-78), the number ot 
Farm Corporations reached to 93 units, while the Plan designated 
for 143 units."^ 
1 Bank Markazi Iran, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, 
Tehran, Iran, 1978, op.cit., p.34 (Persian). 
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4. Production Cooperatives 
Established in 1972, production cooperatives have been 
a new experiment in Iran. The objectives of production 
cooperatives were to (i) consolidate the gains of land 
reforms, (ii) to develop agriculture, and (iii) to increase 
the welfare of farmers. Though these production cooperatives 
resembled to Farm Corporations, yet their mode of functioning 
have been primarily different. 
In February 1971, the production law was approved by 
the government and the first production cooperatives were 
established in 1972, Production Cooperatives undertook to 
join establishment of irrigation facilities, adoption of 
communal cropping patterti, joint cultivation, and marketing, 
etc. 
The Fifth Development Plan (1973-78) envisaged formation 
of 60 production cooperatives. However, only 39 units could 
be formed. These production cooperatives emphasised on the 
initiative of individual farmers where each member could use 
his land according to the 'Manifesto of Production Cooperatives'. 
The land in this case remained in the ownership of the farmers, 
while in Farm Corporations, the area was operated under one 
unit, and fanners received no dividends or wages. Though the 
net income was divided among the shareholders. But in 
1 The main purpose of the production cooperative law was 
to provide an alternative to the Farm Cooperation in 
large scale agricultural production. 
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production cooperatives the gross production from individual 
farmers continued to belong to the respectives farmers. In 
1975, there were 24 production cooperatives which covered 
126 villages and farra units consisting of about 37,000 
hectares. As mentioned earlier, a total of 60 production 
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IMPACT OF LAND REFORM PR0GRAM14E ON 
AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 
Distribution of Ownership and Holding 
In 1960, between 35 and 40 per cent of the peasant 
population was khushnishin (i.e., those without a right of 
cultivation) and the rest was peasant (nasaq-holding) 
cultivators who owned one-third of total agricultural land. 
Thus by aiming to distribute the remaining two-thirds among 
nasaq-holders, the original land reform had intended to turn 
about 60 per cent of rural population into peasant proprietors 
owning all agricultural land in the country. As we have 
already seen, about 23 per cent benefited from the operations 
of the first stage of the land reform while others were left 
to use the provisions of the second stage for purchasing 
land directly from the landlords, entering partnership with 
them, selling their own rights to them, etc., consequently 
when the land reform officially ended, about 82 per cent of 
agricultural land belong to peasant producers, the remaining 
18 per cent being owned by independent capitalist farmers 
(who were either former landlords or other who had purchased 
their estates from them) and the modern sectors (Table 4,10 ) 
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Direct data for the propoirtion of peasant proprietors after 
the reform are not available. What is certain is that: (a) Khush-
nishins were not effected, (b) a certain proportion of peasants 
had owned their land before the reform, (c) 23 per cent of them 
received land through the first phase, and (d) 18 per cent of 
total agricultural land still remained outside peasant ownership 
after the reform. Thus, while some nasaq-holders improved their 
position, the khushnishins now become legally (and finally) 
landless. 
More significantly, it has been shown that the distribution 
of holdings was highly inequal before the land reform (1960) and 
that it became even more inequal after the reform (1974 and 1983) . 
The effect of land reform laws are evident in Table 4.1 and 
Figure 1, which shows that the forms of agricultural ownership 
according to both ratio of ownership and area according to 
"Lorenze Curve", and the result of concentration co-efficiency, 
1 Lorenze Curve is a graphic method of measuring desciations 
from the average. It was devised by Dr.Lorenze for measuring 
the inequalities in the distribution of wealth. But it can be 
applied with equal advantage for comparing the distribution 
of profit amongst different groups of business and such other 
things. It is a c\amulative percentage cuirve. In it the per-
centage items are combined with the percentages of such other 
things as wealth, profits, ownership. 
In drawing the Lorenze curve the following steps are 
necessary: (1) The various groups of each variable should b«^  
reduced to percentages. Thus if it is desired to show the 
distribution of ownership amongst the various groups of owners 
should be reduced in the form of percentage of total owners. 
So also the ownership derived by these groups in terms of 
total ownership of possession of the country, (2) the two sets 
of the percentages obtained by step (1) should then be cximulated 
and cximulative percentages thus determined, (3) the cxunulative 
percentage of these two variables should then be plotted along 
the axis of (y) and axis of (x) , The scale along the axis of 
(y) begins from zero while the scale along the axis (x) begins 
F i g u r e 4 : 1 
LORENZ* CURVE OF OWKERSHIP DISTRIBUTION IN 
SELECTED YEARS 
0 
Percentage of ownership of land 











Source; Compiled on the table No.4, 
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regarding to Gini concentration co-efficiency during 1960-83,The 
Gini concentration ratio for the distribution of land among variou: 
holdings shows 0.52174 in 1960 and 0,6084 in 1974, and 0,55019 in 
1983. However, these ratios, and the growing inequality which they 
reflect, refer to the distribution of total agricultural land 
among all categories of holdings. The case of nasaq-holders as a 
group was somewhat different. First they collectively increased 
their ownership from 33 to 82 per cent of total agricultural land. 
Second, the distribution of land being inherently in favour of 
smaller farm sizes led to a gain by the lower and specially middle 
sized groups to large ones. The table 4.2 shows that as a result 
of land distribution, all sizes improved their share of the total, 
1 (contd.) with (100) at the point of intersection and goes upto 
zero towards the right, (4) the points (100, (100) along the 
axis (y) and the points (0,0) along the axis of (x) should be 
joined by straight line. The line so obtained is called the 
line of equal distribution; and serves as the basis for dis-
tribution deviates from the ideal distribution given by this 
line, (5) the actual data may now be plotted on the graph in 
the ordinary manner and the plotted points may be connected 
by the means of a curve. Further, the curve obtained under 
step (5) is from the line of equal distribution, the greater 
is the deviation. 
1 Gini Coefficient: One s\immary measure of the degree of inequa-
lity is the ratio of the shaded area in the figure the entire 
area under the Mne of the equal distribution. The measure is 





where xi = cumulated owners, yi = cumulated area of ownership. 
The measure remains the most widely used suuiunary statistics 
for discribing inequality. It is reasonable to conjecture 
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it was the lower and middle sizes (and specially those between 2 
to 50 hectares) that gained most. 
To sum up, land reform increased peasant's share of land frcan 
about 33 to over 80 per cent and probably reduced the inequality 
of land distribution among the peasants but it also created a large 
class of landless agricultural labourers (khushnishin). Over 15 
per cent of agricultural land was left to the landlords who turned 
it — partly in words and partly in deeds — into relatively large 
independent capitalist farms and the remainder was converted into 
modem 'agro-business and farm corporation' fanning. 
Table 4.2 
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND CWNERSHIP AMONG NASAQ-HOLDERS 
(1960 -72 ) 
Size (hectares) 1960 (%) 1972 (%) 
Less than 1 
1 to less than 2 
2 to less than 5 
5 to less than 10 
10 to less than 50 
50 to less than 100 
100 and above 
TOTAL 
Source: Azimi, Aspects of Poverty, Ch. 8, Table No, 2, 
p.337. 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
The most important factor during 1963-78 influenced 
state policies and thus economic growth and structural change 
in Iran had been the rapid growth of oil industry and 
explosion of oil revenues. Oil was the independent variaible 


















a rapid change in the country's economic structure, the 
plight of the agricultural sector, a continuous rise in the 
rate of rural-urban migration, the creation of acute imbalances 
between and within various economic sectors, a higher capital 
output ratio, and an increasing rate of inflation. 
During 1962-72, the real gross national product increased 
by an average rate of 11 per cent annually. For 1973 and 1974 
the increase in OJP was higher than the previous year mainly 
due to rising prices of oil which caused over exploitation of 
oil resources. The average growth rate of agricultural sector 
during 1962-72 was 3.6 per cent while population growth rate 
was 2.9 per cent. This shows that there was more food available 
of the rate of 0.6 per cent in the country. But per capita 
food consumption of wheat, rice, sugar, milk and mutton at 
the same time declined due to rise in prices which rose by 
21 per cent. Moreover, import of agricultural goods was 
doubled in the same period. This indicates that agricultural 
production has not increased at the rate higher than popula-
2 
tion growth rate during the decade. 
The relative decline of agricultural sector is clearly 
demonstrated by the data in tables 4.3 and 4,3a between 
1962-77 per centage share of agriculture in GDP has declined 
from 26.6 per cent to 9.1 per cent. In 1977 agriculture and 
manufacturing together contributed less than 22 per cent of 
1 Based on Bank Markazi Iran, National Income 1960-72, 1973, 
p. 24 (Persian) . 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aggregate output, while services accounted for over 34 of it. 
The share of manufacturing includes both traditional and 
modern and both rural and urban manufacturing output. In 
1977/8, the share of oil and services together v;as more than 
72 per cent of the national output. The share of agriculture 
in GDP in 1972 increased from 88.8 billion Rials to 122.3 
billion Rials and total GDP increased from 33.7 billion Rials 
in 1962 to 830.5 billion Rials in 1972 or something around 
two and-a-half time of 1962. The GDP rose from 271 billion 
Rials in 1973 to 339 billion Rials in 1977. Unfortunately, 
figures in Tables 4.3 and 4,3a are not comparable, because 
the base year differ. The Table 4,3 based on 1959/60 prices 
whereas Table No. 4.3a is based on 1974/75 prices. 
Table 4.4 shows the annual growth rates of GDP as well as 
various sectoral components for under Three Plan periods. It 
can be observed that both GDP and its various components except 
agriculture grew rapidly throughout the period 1962-77. 
Agriculture grew at the rate of 4,5 per cent during the 
Third Plan period, 2,6 per cent during Fourth Plan period, 
while oil sector increased from 12,7 per cent during Third 
Plan period to 20.6 per cent during Fifth Plan period. 
Table 4.5 provides a summary view of the composition and 
distribution of various types of agricultural activity in 
initial and terminal years of the Third Fifth Plan. It 
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crop farming and livestock production in total agricultural 
output have remained constant at^ 55 and 32 per cent respec-
tively. But since the values are given in current prices, 
the near constancy of these shares conceals the fact that 
price of livestock products has increased much faster than 
that of crop output. This point may be verified from the 
figure in table 4.5 for the period upto the year 1971/2. 
Here the share of crop farming grew from 67 to 72 per cent, 
while that of livestock production declined from 32 to 26 
per cent. And there is no reason to believe that this trend 
was reversed in latter periods. 
The above tendencies are reflected in the total and 
sectoral growth rates of agriculture over the period 1962-72. 
The overall growth rate appears to have been 3,6 during 1962-71 
and the growth rates of crop production and livestock were 
recorded as 4,5 and 1,7 per cent respectively, 
AS regards the performance of crop farming and livestock 
production, the following conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, 
the higher growth of crop production in the period 1962-72 
tends to support the view that the original land distribution 
programme did not have an adverse effect on crop production 
whereas the subsequent "modernisation" schemes did (Table 4.5). 
•Secondly, the better performance of crop output as compared 
to livestock production, over the whole of the decade 1962-72, 
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this period and (b) by the phenomenal growth of the appli-
cation of modern inputs (see table 4.5 and 4,5). Thirdly, the 
near zero growth rate of livestock output during period 
1962-67 is likely to be the result of the set back to mutton 
and dairy production, in part as a result of the policy of 
enforced settlement of the nomadic population, and in part 
because many peasants were deprived of the use of natural 
pasture. 
Table 4.7 shows that among these three .cereal crops, 
i.e., wheat, barley and rice, wheat registered relative high 
productivity. During 1962-67 the production of wheat increased 
by 3,8 million tonnes, while it has shown a slight variation 
of -0.9 per cent during 1971-72. The period 1962-63 was 
recorded a production of 2,7 million metric tonnes. On the 
other hand per hectare yield during these three periods had 
also showh a great variation as high yield per hectare was 
recorded in 1967-68 and low yield per hectare was recorded in 
1971-72. 
Barley occupied second place. The total output per 
hectare during 1962-63 and 1967-68 had almost remained the 
same, while as in wheat during same period, the output per 
hectare was recorded a great variation. The production of 
barley was higher during 1967-68, i.e., 1,035 million metric 
tonnes, while a production of 0,76 million metric tonnes 
was recorded during 1962-63. 
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T a b l e 4 . 6 
THE APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL INPUT TO IRANIAN 











































Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation, 
Production Year Book, various issues, 
1962. 
8 6 
T a b l e 4 . 7 
QUANTITIES OF OUTPUT AND THEIR GROWTH, SELECTED 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS DURING LAND REFORM PROGRAMME 
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 1 9 6 7 - 6 8 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 1 9 6 2 - 7 2 
WHEAT 
a) Quantity of output , „ , a , -
(Million metric tonnes) ^'' "^'^ ^'' 
b) Annual growth of total e o no 
output '"'^ - ^'^ "^'^ 
c) Output per hectare (kg) 720 1,050 700 
d) Annual growth rate of _ , . ^ , 
output per hectare '"'^ " " * 
0.9 
8 . 3 
830 
5 . 1 
- 3 . 5 
721 





a) Quantity of output n TA I n-^ e: 
(Million metric tonnes) ^-'^ J..UJS 
b) Annual growth of total o -a -j c An 
output (%) " ^'^ '^'^ ^-^ 
c) Output per hectare (kg) 830 
d) Annual growth rate of 
output per hectare (%) ~ 
RICE 
a) Quantity of output „ „ n QA i ne;n 
(Million metric tonnes) "*' "'^^ ^'^^^ 
b) Annual growth of total . ^ no An 
output (%) ~ "^'^ 2.8 4.2 
c) Output per hectare (kg) 2,000 2,549 2,727 
d) Annual growth rate of -a „ , q ^ p. 
output per hectare '-'^  "" •**" ^'^ '^ 
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Next to barley comes rice. During 1971-72 the production 
in rice had shown an increase of 2.8 per cent over 1967-68 and 
low production of 0,7 million metric tonnes was recorded 
during 1962-63. But overall productivity of rice is not so 
satisfactory as compared to wheat and barley. Output per 
hectare of rice was low as compared to other two periods, i.e., 
1967-68 and 1971-72. 
On the other hand Table 4.8 gives a comparative assess-
ment of yield per hectare of rice in Iran with other Asian 
countries. It is seen from table 4.8 that, rice has a satis-
factory position of yield per hectare as compared to other 
countries. The yield per hectare of rice in Iran is only 
1 per cent less as compared to India and is equal to that of 
China, VJhile as it is about 35 per cent less than that of 
Japan and South Korea. On the other hand wheat and barley 
lagged far behind the per hectare yield with other Asian 
countries. 
It would be very interesting to discover whether or not 
the 'modern'system of agriculture production turn out to be 
significantly more efficient than the traditional system. 
Table 4.9 gives the amount of investment and percentage 
share of the agricultural sectors in development expenditure of 
the three plan periods. On an average, only 10 per cent of the 
state plan funds were spent on agriculture. Furthermore, 
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were allocated to the modem which accounted no more than 
2.8 per cent of the total agricultural land, and the rest to 
the traditional sector, which include independent (i.e., 
non-corporate) capitalist farms (see table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 


















1. T r a d i t i o n a l (non-
corporate) 
i) Peasant 
i i ) Independent C a p i t a l i s t ( .7) 
2. Modem (Corpotate) 
i l i ) Farm corporat ions 
iv) Agri-business 
TOTAL ( 1 + 2 ) 17.7 100.0 
Source; Based on the Statistical Centre of Iran, Agri-
cultural Census, 1971 (compilation data 1973, in 
Persian), and Ministry of Corporative and Rural 
Affairs, Various Reports 1971-6 (in Persian). 
Table 4,10 shows the distribution of land holdings among 
various system of agricultural production. In 1976, the 
traditional or non-corporate sectors held 97.2 per cent of the 
total area, while the modem or corporate sector held the 
remaining 2.8 per cent, 1.7 per cent of which was held by 
farm corporations, and 1.1 per cent by agro-businesses. However, 
the distribution of holding within the traditional non-corporate 
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sector itself may not be entirely accurate, direct data on 
the holdings of independent capitalist farms are not available, 
but indirect data (e.g., the size of holdings and the use of 
wage labour in production) indicate that this should be about 
2.7 million hectares or 15,2 per cent of total holdings. Thus, 
peasant holdings accounted for about 82 per cent of the 
cultivated area. Finally, although data on the distribution 
of population and labour force among these various sytems of 
production are not available, the capital intensive technology 
of the corporate sector and their insignificant share of total 
land holdings indicate that their share of the agricultural 
labour force must likewise have been insignificant. 
Table 4,11 shows amount and distribution of state loans and 
non-returnable grants paid (over the period 1968-75) to the 
peasant and farm corporation sector. It should be noted: 
Table 4,11 
STATE LOAMS mD GRANTS TO THE PEASENT SECTOR AND FARM 
CORPORATION-1968-75 
rS^ tal 1968-75 
(million Rials) 
1. The peasant sector: Loans 1,08,895 
2, Farm Corporations 7,841 
i) Free grants (6,322) 81 % 
ii) Loans (1,519) 19 % 
Source: Homa Khatauzian, Agriarian Reform in Con-
temporary, Croom Helm, England, Table 8,13, 
p. 332. 
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(a) that 6,322 million rials or 81 per cent of total payments 
to farm corporations were in the form of non-returnable 
grants, and (b) that the remaining 1,519 million rials (or 
19 per cent of the total) consisted 5 to 15-years loans 
carrying administrative interest rate ranging from 2 to 8 
per cent but an effective interest rate was 1 per cent. On 
the other hand, the credit extended to the peasant sector 
through the cooperative societies consisted entirely of short 
term (mainly annual) loans carrying on effective interest of 
6 per cent, moreover, the total amount of loans to the 
peasants shown In Table 4.31 is almost certainly an over-
estimate, it was a widespread practice among cooperative 
societies to record outstanding loan (which the peasants were 
unable to repay) as new credit. 
The farm corporations, however, had a much smaller share 
of land holdings in the earlier years than they did in 1975. 
For this reason, figures in Table 4.12 showing the overall 
payments per hectare of land between 1968 and 1975 and their 
annual averages provide a better comparison. 
Table 4.12 
STATE LOANS AND GRANTS TO THE PEASANT SECTOR AND 
FARM CORPORATION (Rials)-1968-75 
Per Hectare Per hectare 
1968-75 per annum 
1. The peasant sector: Loans 
2. Farm corporation: Grants 
3. Farm Corporation: Loans 









1 The t was allowed to br reinvested by farms. 
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A main agency for the supply of low-interest, long- and 
medixim-term credit was the Agricultural Development Bank. 
Theoretically, the Bank would land only to those producers who 
owned not less than 500 hectares, but in practice, producers 
with smaller holdings could also have access to its loans and 
credits. Assuming that the Bank was prepared to lend to all 
farm size above 100 hectares, it has been estimated that 88 
per cent of holdings, i.e., virtually the whole of the 
traditional sector, would have been excluded from the Bank's 
lendings. This being the case, peasant producers could hardly 
have access to ordinary commercial banks whose interest charges 
and other conditions for giving credit were in any case non-
preferential. 
The methods of payments and receipts were themselves very 
different in their social-economic implications, agro-business 
farm corporations and large capitalists farms received state 
grants and loan directly though then own menagements, but 
peasants had to depend on the favours of the bureaaratic 
heads of their cooperative societies, who in turn had to depend 
on the heads of the cooperative unions, who in their turn had 
to depend on the higher officials in the Agricultural Coopera-
tive Bank and the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs. 
A part from all this embezzlement and corruption were more 
easily possible through the cooperative network than through 
other systems, and the allocation of credit to peasants was 
generally influenced by the relative financial and social 
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standing of different groups of peasantry. 
A consequence of lack of access to long term credit is low 
capital investment. Tables 4,13 and 4,14 show the pattern of 
distribution of capital stock among different systems of 
agricultural production. 
Table 4.13 
THE DISTRIBUTION OP CAPITAL BY VARIOUS AGRI-
CULTURAL SYSTEM 
-___j Total Capital 
No.of holdings capital per 
Units (100 hec- (Million hectare 






























Source; Based on Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, 1977/8, 
(Table on p.102), Tehran. 
From column 4 of table 4,13 it can be seen that in 1977-8, 
capital per hectare of land held by agro-businesses firms was 
46 times, and that of farm corporations nearly 9 times, that 
in the peasant sector. 
Table 4,14 extends the comparison of the membership of 
the peasant cooperatives societies and farm cooperations. The 
membership of farm corporations was only 1.2 per cent of the 
total membership of both systems taken together, whereas it 
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claimed 15.3 per cent of their total capital. The corres-
ponding figures for the peasant sector being respectively, 
98,8 of total membership and 84.7 per cent. 
Table 4.14 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF I-IEMBERSHIP AND CAPITAL PEASANT 






























Source: Based on Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report 1977/8, 
Table on p.102, Tehran, Iran. 
The basic difference between the three systems were in 
the quality of land, the availability of water, the scale of 
production, the choice of technique, the mode of ownership, 
employment and distribution and the managerial organisation. 
The agro-business system was well endowed in land and water 
resources, used modern capital-intensive techniques, produced 
on a very large scale divorced ownership from management and 
labour and had a bureaucratic, management system. The same 
characteristics existed in the farm corporations system, 
though less strongly. In particular, the scale was smaller, 
technology relatively mixed, much of the labour was supplied 
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by smaller shareholders, and bureaucratic managers were to 
a limited extent bound by the corporate spirit. Finally, the 
traditional sector was dominated by small-scale production 
dependent on the use of traditional techniques and inputs 
as well as family labour, and in general suffered from very 
serious water constraints. 
Income distribution 
The consequences of state policies towards agriculture 
since 1963 regarding the equitable distribution of rural 
income as well as for en5)loyment and levels of living of the 
rural population have been far from desirable goals. The 
difference in the general level of welfare (including private 
consumption and state services) between the urban sector and 
rural society rapidly increased and, specially after 1973, 
became more pronounced. A.part from that, there was an increase 
in the degree of inequality, between the nasaq-holding peasants 
who had received land through the land reform and those (includ-
ing khushnishins) who had not, the degree of inequality among 
the nasaq-holders themselves also increased. Regional differences 
in rural incomes and welfare tended to get worse. Poverty 
and unemployment among the roiral immigrants into towns — 
itself being a consequence of agricultxiral depression and 
peasant destitution — became the single most pressing social 
problem about which, however, absolutely not much was done. 
97 
Upto 1972 separate figures for urban and riiral consumption 
were made publicly available.Since such data are not available 
for the latter years, ive have obtained separate estimate for 
urban and rural consumption simply assuming that rural 
consumption has been equal total value added in agriculture 
and therefore that urban consumption is equal to the difference 
between total private consumption end value added in agriculture. 
The data presented in Table 4.15#which shows the percentage 
distribution of private consximption and population between 
urban and rural sector of the economy, has therefore been 
taken as indicator of general trends. 
Though there are some limitations of data, we can draw 
the following conclusions. Firstly, there is clear evidence 
that rural-urban consumption inequality, already considerable 
in the initial period (1963) had significantly increased by 
1978. Secondly, a large proportion of the growth of urban 
population was due to peasant migration into towns and the 
consumption of immigrant peasants was probably not much more 
than previously, hence the use of official figures for the 
urban sector's share in total population tends to understate 
the growth of consumption inequality between the tv;o sectors. 
Thirdly, the v;elfare benefits of high and rapidly rising 
state consumption expenditure (not shown in the table) were 
almost exclusively enjoyed by the urban sector. 
Some of the above conclusions can be more readily grasped 
from the distribution of private consumption per capita as 
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shown in table 4.16. In 1963, urban and rural consumption 
per capita were, respectively, US $ 210 and US $ 97 in 1978, 
US $ 1,442 and US $ 383. It has also been shown in table 4.17 
that as such between 1963 and 1978 the ratio of rural to 
national per capita consumption fell from 0.7 to 0.4. These 
estimates are all based on current prices and in particular 
they do not take into account the deterioration of the terms 
of trade against agriculture over the period. 
Poverty and Unemployment 
One consequence of the general agricultural and rural 
crisis was the flight of labour from the agriculture accord-
ing to official estimates, about 1,7 per cent of the rural 
population has been migrating annually from rural to urban 
areas in recent years. Given a country-wide population growth 
rate of 2.9 per cent, the rate of growth of rural population 
(net of migration) was about 1.2 per cent per year. 
We do not have specificied data on rural unemployment, 
but it seems plausible to suppose that rural-urban migration 
essentially reflected deteriorating employment conditions 
in rural areas and operated as a mechanism for transferring 
poverty from rural to urban areas. In 1978, the country total 
labour force was about 10 million, out of it 3,5 million were In 
the mral sector. The official estimate of the general rate 
of unemployment was 9 per cent. 
1 M. Naghizadeh, The role of farmer's self determination 
collective action and cooperatives in agricultural 
development, Tokyo, Univ. of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, 
Japan, p.329. 
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Unemployment, poverty and destitution in the urban 
sector has been regarded as a consequence of the crisis in 
agriculture. The peasant immigrants whose very existence 
on the edge of the cities went completely unrecognised. It 
has been considered not as section of the urban poor, but as 
impoverished of the peasantry. They had left for having 
better life in cities and towns, where they have been put in 
much worse conditions. It is Often said that they have found 
nothing more than what they had left behind. These immigrants 
found themselves in economically and socially worst possible 
conditions; Neither they were provided adequate shelter nor 
reasonable employment. They are now in the position not 
even to think to go back because they have been badly uprooted 
by selling their property and assets owned by them in villages. 
Not only this much but*more adverse conditions from their re-
settlement point of view. Government's policy regarding their 
settlement providing adequate employment and housing facilities 
has been almost nil. It is very essential to adopt a clear-
cut policy about their employment and income so that they can 
























































































































T a b l e 16 
?HE SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
SELECTED YEARS ( 1 9 6 3 - 7 8 ) 
(US $) 
1963 1968 1973 1978 
1 . Urban p e r c a p i t a c o n s \ i m p t i o n 2 0 9 . 9 2 8 8 . 2 4 0 1 . 6 1 4 4 2 , 2 
2 . R u r a l p e r c a p i t a c o n s u m p t i o n 9 7 , 3 1 2 3 . 1 1 6 1 . 8 3 8 2 . 8 
3 . C o u n t r y - w i d e p e r c a p i t a ^^^^ ^gg^g 3 1 ^ 0 Q^^,! 
c o n s u m p t i o n 
S o u r c e : B a s e d on Bank Markazi I r a n , Annual R e p o r t s , v a r i o u s 
d a t e s and o f f i c i a l p o p u l a t i o n s t a t i s t i c s . 
T a b l e 4 . 1 7 
SECTORAL PER CAPITA CONSUldPTIOJ RELATIVE TO COUNTRY-V^DE 
PRIVATE PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 1 9 6 3 - 7 8 - SELECTED YEARS 
1963 1968 1973 1978 
1 . Urban 
2 . R u r a l 
3 . C o u n t r y - w i d e . . . 
Source: Based on Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Reports, various 
dates and official population statistics. 
1.50 
0 . 7 1 
1.00 
1 .50 
0 . 6 6 
1 .00 
1.60 
0 . 5 1 
1 .00 
1 .60 




Agrarian reform in developing countries tends to be 
motivated by aspirations to transform traditional agriculture 
to modem one. Initially, the land reform in Iran had 
intended to reduce the size of large holdings, distribute 
land and institute rural cooperatives among the peasants who 
had traditionally cultivated the land always without owning 
it. The prcanoters of the Land Reform Law of 1962 had hoped 
that these institutional changes would help increase agri-
cultural productivity, living standards and would also increase 
demand for manufactured products, provide resources for urban 
industrial development, and create a more stable socio-
political atmosphere. 
But the following points concerning land reform of 1962 
are worth mentioning: 
1. The land was given to some portion of the rural population 
while agricultural labour (khushnashins) were not given land 
perhaps because they did not have cultivation rights on land. 
Thus they were not allowed to join the rural cooperatives as 
well. Consequently, not only that 35-40 per cent of rural 
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population could not acquire land, but they were denied 
cooperative services, like credit, consumer goods, etc. Thus 
the disparity of income among farmers turned to be wider. 
2. AS the land was not equally distributed, the dualistic 
stiructure of farm size was created, which caused many socio-
economic problems in management structure of the cooperatives. 
3. The big landownership continued to persist in Iran. As 
such after more than 25 years, the 1,000 hectares private and 
capitalist fazms continued to exist with one hectare family 
farms. This became possible because under the name of "mechani-
zed farm" more than one and half million hectares/ and, under 
the name of gardening and tea plantation, etc. thousands of 
hectares were exen^ted from the land distribution programme 
4. The law of programme gave priority in receiving land 
cultivators, but did ensure that they actually continue to 
work on the land themselves after distribution as they did in 
the past. In practice this meant that non-cultivating group 
such as small or large renter from absentee landowners 
(malik, including State, ex-Shah and waqf) or gaveband, got 
land, while casual labourer with regular wage, in cash or kind 
which constituted 35-40 per cent of the villagers, did not 
benefit from the programme. 
5. Instead of being free of charges, the prices of sold land 
to the peasant was so high that for most of them farm revenue 
was not enough to pay their instalments. On the other hand 
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the Government was concerned with providing huge amount of 
loan to large farms and not so much concerned with supplying 
enough credit to local cooperative and their members. 
Therefore, peasants instead of concentrating on productive 
activities and investment project, were engaged in arreinging 
for the required credit from local money-lenders for meeting 
their obligations, deposit their annual instalments, and for 
meeting their consumption needs, 
6. The farmers did not receive the necessary assistance for 
forming their own organisation and groupings, specially, in 
order to organise and maintain their collectively owned 
equipments and infrastructure. 
7. Where the beneficiaries could not organise a purposeful 
cooperative, the traditional organisation which prevalied in 
the villages gradually disintegrated. This in tu:cn led to a 
noticeable attitude of individualism among the farmers. 
8. The prograiwne instead of emphasising at voluntary 
cooperative farming, put its utmost power to create large-
scale state-controlled farm organisations and foreign 
capalist agro-busineases which even after constsning huge 
capital and hiiman resources, failed. 
The performance of agro-business farms was extremely 
poor. Their unit cost of production was characteristically 
higher than those in the peasant sector. The reasons for 
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this poor performance were several: the units were too large, 
their management structure was ill-suited to the local 
conditions, their imported technology was ill-adopted, and 
their work-force was typically made up of expropriated former 
peasant labour holders used as migrant labour. Farm coopera-
tions performed relatively better than agro-business farms 
because of their smaller size and more relevant forms of 
ownership, management, technology and employment. Yet 
considering the moral and material support which they received 
frcxn the State, their performance was also disappointing. The 
distribution of the social and economic boundaries of the 
traditional village, the immiserdLsation of the poorer peasants 
and the direct bureaucratisation of the decision-making 
involved, were among the major reasons for their inefficient 
functionihg. 
The available evidence clearly indicates that, in spite 
of the anti-peasant State policies, the performance of peasant 
agriculture was better than agro-businesses and farm 
corporations, but it grew at a slow rate and remained econo-
mically undeveloped and socially underprivileged. The 
extension of the central bureaucracy to the villages, and the 
official contempt for the peasantry which was amply reflected 
in the attitude and behaviour of local (civilian as well as 
military) officials, created social instability, economic 
insecurity and psychological resentment among the peasants. 
In the meantime, from 1973-4 onwards oil revenues and 
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for the matter urban living standards, though at a very 
different rates for different social classes, have been 
rising. This, given the deteiorating conditions of a section 
of peasantry, created a strong incentive for peasant migration 
into towns. However, the ultlraiaodem technology applied to 
modern manufacturing and service production, even road 
construction, left little einployment opportxmity for purely 
manual labour. Migrant peasants had no capital of their own, 
and, they were con^letely alien to the urban culture.The 
rapid rise of uxban food and dwelling prices resulted in hunger 
and homelessness of the immigrant peasants. Thus, both in 
villages and in tcwns, the scales were drastically turned 
against the Iranian peasantry, resulting in extensive under-
nourishment in a country, with a per capita inc<xne of US $ 700 
per annum. This is one of the contexts in which the revolution 
of 1979 took place. 
According to the United Nation's publication 'Progress 
in Land Reform, summarized the situation of land distribution 
in Iran in 1966 as followst 
"These land reform measures have, however, by no means, 
solved the problems of Iranian agriculture. There was nothing 
to prevent landlords from reordering ths cultivation pattern 
in their villages before the land reform reached them in such 
a way as to ensure that the best land — or indeed any land 
1 United Nations, Progress in Land Reform (Fourth Report) , 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1966, 
pp. 24-25. 
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at all — went to their friends, relatives, and loyal dependents. 
Again, landlords who exercised their option to retain a 
collection of parts of villages, ndght contrive to retain the 
beat part of each and even, perhaps, those parts which dominate 
the water supply for the rest of the village... Again, in 
those districts where was a tenancy hierarchy the land some-
times gone to the entrepreneurial gaveband who did not 
cultivate, directly, rather leased to the crop sharing labourers 
who have derived no benefits from the programme. Thus a new 
class of landlords may have been cxreated. It Is, Indeed, the 
explicit intention of the programme not to establish equality, 
but to create an extended tenure ladder. As the Shah said in 
one of his speechs, "our alms are not to destroy landlords. 
What we are doing is a means of making it possible to become 
small landlords. Those who become owners of land today, we 
hope will become small and lords in the future". 
This was a scheme to perpetrate landlordism in one way 
or the other, obviously to the utter negation of any Idea 
of a meaningful land reform.".,. The other Immense problem 
is to fihd some rapid substitute for the organisational and 
physical service formerly provided by the leuidlords and their 
agents. It is not clear how effective the new cooperatives 
will be in this respect, in view of the fact that Iranian 
farmers have- very little eacperlences of egalltrarlan cooperation. 
By 1963, nearly 2,000 cooperative associations had been formed, 
1 Ibid., p.25. 
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but it is certain that many of these were cooperatives in 
name only, their sole fiuiction being to enable the tenant 
recipients of redistributed land formally to conform with 
the reqxiirements of the law,..** 
Finally, as Mahdavy, an Iranian economist who pairticipated 
in studies of the early effect of land distribution, has 
pointed out, "the land distribution programme left the 
existing land allotments untouched. In the villages affected 
by the programme, only the title deeds of the lands previously 
farmed by the peasants were passed on to them. No redistri-
bution or levelling of the existing disparities between 
different classes of peasants took place. The distinction 
between classes within the village conuminity is seldom 
appreciated." 
Problems of land ownership and uncertainty about new 
regime's land reform policies have added to the difficulties 
affecting the agriculture sector. After the fall of the Shah, 
vAien the authority of the central government was weak, land 
seizures began in many villages. The most dramatic examples 
occurred in the Turkoman and Kurdish areas, where concentra-
tions of large absentee land-holdings were specially pronounced, 
but other areas were also affected. In some cases the 
government did not intervene, but where it did, it tended to 
1 H. Mahdavy, Iran, Agrarian problems, A paper delivered at 
Harvard university, 1965, quoted in N.R.Keddie, The Iranian 
village before and after land reform. The Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.3, No.3 (1968), p.79. 
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oppose land seizures. The events were acccsnpanied by mass 
migration from the countryside to the cities — nearly 1.5 
million rural dwellers migrated to Tehran alone during the 
first year of Revolution. The regime recognized the economic 
disaster that this migration threatened. Some kind of land 
reform promised to keep people on the land and, at the same 
time, moderate land seizures and reassure small owners to 
encourage investment and production. A land reform programme 
prepared by Ministry of Agriculture was submitted to the 
Revolutionary Council at the end of 1979, The programme 
planned to limit the size of holdings to three times the 
average in an area. The large landowners have been accused of 
influencing the clergy to oppose the new measures. The land 
refoirm bill was eventually intzroduced and passed by the Majlis 
in 1981, but later rejected by the Council of Guardians as 
un-lslamic. The form of the land reform bill was then altered, 
and considerably moderated. Land was to be confiscated only 
from former enemies of Revolution and barren or xancultivated 
lands. After many months before the Majlis and deep contro-
versy over the acceptability of the law in the light of 
Islamic principles, the bill was again rejected by Council 
of Guardians of the Constitution. 
For nearly seven years the authorities have been trying 
to reconcile islamic principles with the revolutionary goals 
and expectations, so far without much success. Some observers 
believe that the land reform scheme has now been shelved and 
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that the system of land tenure to emerge under the Revolution 
is a rather conservative one with proper respect for private 
property and one in which the fanner and bazaar have been 
confirmed in their traditional roles. However, it may be 
said that due to Iraq's aggression* there has been depressions 
in all spheres of the econcxny. 
Agriculture which continued to be a successful activity 
was neglected in the pre-Revolution has been discrlbed as the 
weakest spot in the Iranian economy and the biggest impediment 
to progress. Given the high priority by the Islamic Republic 
as the axis of the economy* agriculture has to fulfil its 
designated role. In addition to the landownership question, 
the war has imposed n\imerous constraints. Between 1980 and 
1982, 10 per cent of the agricultural land fell under Iraqi 
occupation; a disproportionate nvonber of volunteers for the 
war effort are drawn from village; and the heavy financial 
burden of the war imposes limits on spending. 
In the light of conclusion and findings, the following 
suggestions need consideration to help Implement the land 
reform programme in an effective manner in Iran: 
1. There should be an early finalization of the details 
concerning the ownership of land and its distribution 
among the Icundless peasants. 
2, Maintenance of an \q>-to-date land records of both the 
ownership and cultivating rights, so that the law 
can be quickly brought into practice. Such detailed 
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records have been lacking in the past with regard 
to holding of land and ownership etc. 
3. There should be a support programme for necessary 
training and implementation of the land reform as 
well as of the persons affected by the reforms, 
4. At the decree of Imam Khomaini an organisation named 
Jahad-e-Sazandigi (Reconstruction crusade) has been 
established in 1979 with its Headquarters at Tehran 
and its branches all over the country. The purpose 
of the organisation is to help villagers and other 
oppressed people. The organisation has been 
successfully working for the reconstruction of 
Iranian economy particularly rural sector. However, 
its activities should be further strenthened and 
expanded for the benefit of the backward and war-torn 
areas in Iran. Secondly, it can play very important 
role in impl«nenting the land reform programme. 
5. The Government, it is hoped, can adopt a strategy 
where the big landlords and those ploughing surplus 
land, can themselves ccxne forward in facilitating 
voluntarily on their own in the land reform programme. 
Needless to say that those landlords who have landless 
peasant relatives in agriculture, priority may be 
given to them for the distribution of surplus land 
6. Agro-business projects have been nationalised after 
the revolution. It is suggested that farm cooperatives 
be encouraged to take scientific farming so that the 
Iranian economy can produce food and raw material 
needed for furthre industrialisation. 
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P r i v a t e e s t a t e s 
Rent 




Peasant without land rights 
National Assembly 









Six parts, i.e., total village 
land 
Endowment land 
Land endowed for pious purposes 
Land endowed for donor's family 
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